An institution holding shares in a firm can use information about the firm both for trading (“speculation”) and for deciding whether to intervene to improve firm performance. Intervention increases the value of the institution's existing shareholdings, but intervention only increases the institution's trading profits if it enhances the precision of the institution's information relative to that of uninformed traders. Thus, the ability to speculate can increase or decrease institutional intervention. We examine key factors that affect the intervention decision, the usefulness of “short-swing” provisions and restricted shares in encouraging institutional intervention, and implications for ownership structure across different firms.

We develop a model of liquidity shortages that incorporates a general equilibrium feature of liquidity: when banks hold more liquidity, other agents in the economy hold less of it and will supply less in times of crisis. We show that the private holdings of liquidity at banks are inefficient, with the direction of the bias being determined by the characteristics of the suppliers of liquidity to banks. Minimum liquidity requirements for banks may reduce welfare; in such cases interest rate policies that stimulate the ex-post supply of liquidity can restore efficiency. Overall, our results show that optimal liquidity policies critically depend on a financial institution’s (marginal) source of liquidity and will hence differ across institutions of different types.

This paper studies rehypothecation, a practice in which financial institutions re-pledge collateral pledged to them by their clients. Rehypothecation enhances provision of funding liquidity to the economy, but it also incurs deadweight cost by misallocating the asset among the agents when counterparties fail. We examine the possibility of a conflict between the intermediary and its borrower on rehypothecation arrangements. The direction of this conflict depends on haircuts of the contract between them: if the contract involves over-collateralization, there tends to be an excessive use of rehypothecation, and if the contract involves under-collateralization, there tends to be an insufficient use of rehypothecation. This offers an empirical prediction of a link between the size of haircut in collateralized financial contracts, borrower information, and the likelihood of rehypothecation.

[This paper derives the equilibrium behavior of a monopoly producer of a durable good in a continuous time framework. We show that if purchasers are subject to rational expectations then a monopolist who cannot precommit to a particular production strategy produces more at every instant of time than does a monopolist who can precommit. Asymptotically the total production of a monopolist who cannot precommit is equal to the welfare maximizing producer's; however the monopolist produces more slowly, as long as firms are subject to increasing marginal costs. Thus we formally demonstrate that the original Coase intuition regarding the efficiency of the monopoly producer of a durable good only holds in the case of constant marginal costs.]

We propose a theory of corporate liquidity management in which signaling through illiquidity is cheaper than signaling through “skin in the game.” This causes ex post liquidation of worthy projects even when there are enough aggregate resources available for their continuation. We examine the policy remedies for this distortion and consider their consequences for the supply of liquidity, interest rate policy, and subsidies.

Demandable-debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension, liquidation, and idle reserve holdings. An explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive-compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uniformed depositors. Demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation. Its usefulness in transacting follows from information-sharing between monitors and nonmonitors.

Like security prices, retail deposit interest rates cluster around integers and “even” fractions. However, explanations for security price clustering are incompatible with deposit rate clustering. A theory based on the limited recall of retail depositors is proposed. It predicts that banks tend to set rates at integers and that rates are “sticky” at these levels. The propensity for integer rates increases with the level of wholesale interest rates and deposit market concentration. When banks set noninteger rates, rates are more likely to be just above, rather than just below, integers. The paper finds substantial empirical support for the theory's implications.

We study a general equilibrium efficiency wage model characterized by fully optimizing agents, flexible prices, and imperfect information. The model has a unique competitive equilibrium with underemployment in a sector (called manufacturing) with efficiency wages, relative to a self-employment sector. Since prices are flexible, the multiplier of manufacturing output with respect to autonomous demand changes may or may not exceed unity: demand changes lead to price effects as well as income effects that work opposite each other. Nevertheless, there always exist government policies that achieve Pareto improvements by switching demand toward the manufacturing sector. Optimal demand-switching policies are explicitly characterized.

This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms.The firms' .superiorinformation about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance.Under plausible assumptions, such aj^reements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk.ll is shown that, if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk-neutral, employment is always ahoue the efficient level.Such a one-period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk-neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information.

We examine how public liquidity should be distributed to firms when immediate production entails externalities, such as by spreading a virus. Direct provision of liquidity can address externalities, but traditional distribution of liquidity (through banks) has informational advantages. We show that which mode is preferred is determined by the variance (but not the level) of firm characteristics in the economy. Traditional provision is always part of the optimal policy when liquidity modes can be combined, and involves promising low interest rates for when the pandemic is over in order to incentivize temporary production shutdowns at firms.