We test whether the reaction of international stock markets to oil shocks can be justified by current and future changes in real cash flows and/or changes in expected returns. We find that in the postwar period, the reaction of United States and Canadian stock prices to oil shocks can be completely accounted for by the impact of these shocks on real cash flows alone. In contrast, in both the United Kingdom and Japan, innovations in oil prices appear to cause larger changes in stock prices than can be justified by subsequent changes in real cash flows or by changing expected returns.

We show that the consolidation of orders is important for producing efficient prices, especially during times of high liquidity demand. The NYSE's centralized opening call market performs better than Nasdaq's decentralized opening process on typical trading days. The NYSE is much better than Nasdaq on witching days when index arbitrage activity subjects S&P 500 stocks to large, predictable, and mostly informationlessorder flow around quarterly futures contract expirations. Nasdaq opening price efficiency improves to NYSE levels once Nasdaq initiates a consolidated opening call in November 2004, but prices on the decentralized Nasdaq remain less efficient at other times of day.

We examine the reaction of daily Treasury bond prices to the release of U.S. macroeconomic news. These news releases (of employment and producer price index data) are of interest because they are released on periodic, preannounced dates and because they are associated with substantial bond market volatility. We investigate whether these nonautocorrelated announcements give rise to autocorrelated volatility. We find that announcement-day volatility does not persist at all, consistent with the immediate incorporation of information into prices. We also find a risk premium on these release dates.

Responding to a September 2002 regulatory enforcement, the Island electronic communications network stopped displaying its limit order book in the three most active exchange-traded funds (ETFs) where it was the dominant venue. Island’s share of trading activity and price discovery fell, fragmenting the market. ETF prices adjust more slowly when Island goes dark, and there is substantial price discovery movement from ETFs to the futures market. Trading costs increase on Island and decrease off Island, with higher trading costs overall. When Island later redisplays its orders, market quality improves, with transparency and the reduction in fragmentation both playing important roles.

In June 1997, the New York Stock Exchange lowered its minimum price increment on most stocks from eighths to sixteenths. We use a sample of institutional trades to directly measure the effect of this tick size reduction on execution costs. Though quoted and effective spreads decline, realized execution costs for these institutions increase after the change to sixteenths. Costs increase most for orders that aggressively demand liquidity, including large orders, orders placed by momentum traders, and orders not worked by the trading desk. These findings emphasize that spreads are not a sufficient statistic for market quality. Smaller tick sizes may actually reduce market liquidity.

The total effects of a regulatory change consist of direct effects and indirect effects (spillovers), but the standard difference-in-difference approach mostly ignores potential indirect effects. During the 2007 full repeal of the uptick rule, short-sellers become much more aggressive across the board, even in control stocks where the uptick rule is already suspended. This finding is consistent with positive and significant indirect effects on control stocks, likely driven by aggressive broad list-based shorting. In contract, the indirect effect coefficients on shorting aggressiveness are negative for the 2005 partial uptick repeal, possibly due to substitutions between control and treatment stocks.

In September 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) temporarily banned most short sales in nearly 1,000 financial stocks. We examine the ban's effect on market quality, shorting activity, the aggressiveness of short sellers, and stock prices. The ban's effects are concentrated in larger stocks; there is little effect on firms in the lower half of the size distribution. Although shorting activity drops by about 77% in large-cap stocks, stock prices appear unaffected by the ban. All but the smallest quartile of firms subject to the ban suffer a severe degradation in market quality.

This paper demonstrates how the principal-agent problem between venture capitalists and their investors (limited partners) causes limited partner returns to depend on diversifiable risk. Our theory shows why the need for investors to motivate VCs alters the negotiations between VCs and entrepreneurs and changes how new firms are priced. The three-way interaction rationalizes the use of high discount rates by VCs and predicts a correlation between total risk and net of fee investor returns. We take our theory to a unique data set and find empirical support for the effect of the principal-agent problem on equilibrium private equity asset prices.

We show that the positive volatility-volume relation documented by numerous researchers actually reflects the positive relation between volatility and the number of transactions. Thus, it is the occurrence of transactions per se, and not their size, that generates volatility; trade size has no information beyond that contained in the frequency of transactions. Our results suggest that theoretical research needs to entertain scenarios in which (1) both the frequency and size of trades are endogenously determined, yet (2) the size of trades has no information content beyond that contained in the number of transactions. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

We test whether the reaction of international stock markets to oil shocks can be justified by current and future changes in real cash flows and/or changes in expected returns. We find that in the postwar period, the reaction of United States and Canadian stock prices to oil shocks can be completely accounted for by the impact of these shocks on real cash flows alone. In contrast, in both the United Kingdom and Japan, innovations in oil prices appear to cause larger changes in stock prices than can be justified by subsequent changes in real cash flows or by changing expected returns.