This study examines the relationship between government subsidies and income smoothing using a sample of US‐listed firms. We find that subsidized firms smooth their earnings more aggressively than their unsubsidized peers. This finding is consistent with the reasoning that subsidized firms bear higher political costs and have more incentives to smooth earnings to avoid public attention. In addition, smoothing by subsidized firms is more pronounced when the subsidies are granted through non‐tax‐related channels than through tax‐based channels, and the positive association between government subsidies and income smoothing is stronger for firms under higher public scrutiny and with less transparent information environments. Further analysis shows that smoothing by subsidized firms serves mainly to obfuscate earnings and that subsidized firms that smooth earnings tend to continue receiving subsidies in the future. Overall, our results help explain the role of government subsidies in shaping firms' accounting and disclosure choices.

ABSTRACT There is an ongoing debate over uniformity versus flexibility in accounting regulation. This study examines the financial reporting consequences of a rigid accounting rule in China under which the fiscal year-end is uniform for all companies. Using extensive interviews together with large-sample archival analyses, we find that “mismatched” firms—those whose mandated financial reporting cycles are not aligned with their business cycles—exhibit higher levels of absolute abnormal accruals than their nonmismatched counterparts. Further analyses suggest that the negative association between mismatching and financial reporting quality is mainly driven by unintentional estimation errors rather than intentional earnings manipulation. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; K22.

ABSTRACT This study examines whether politicians exhibit hometown favoritism in assigning preferential corporate income tax rates. We find that firms with hometown connections to incumbent provincial leaders experience favorable tax treatment. This effect is more pronounced when those leaders have strong hometown preferences and weaker when they have a strong incentive to seek promotion, suggesting that social incentives are the primary drivers of the effects on corporate tax benefits of hometown favoritism by politicians. Moreover, this effect is intensified when members of senior management have personal connections with the provincial leader. The mechanism test reveals that the provincial governments tend to qualify connected firms for preferential tax policies under their jurisdictions. Overall, our results suggest that hometown favoritism by politicians promotes tax benefits for business entities. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classification: H26; H71; M48.