We examine a model of market equilibrium in which there is less information available about some of the securities in the market than about others. We consider the model as a potential explanation of the well-known small firm anomaly. Using period of listing as a proxy for quantity of information, we find an association between period of listing and security returns that cannot be accounted for by firm size and which is not diminished by an elimination of January returns data from our sample. Thus, we observe a new empirical regularity in the data and refer to the regularity as the ‘period of listing’ effect.

We propose a simple model of equilibrium asset pricing in which there are differences in the amounts of information available for developing inferences about the returns parameters of alternative securities. In contrast with earlier work, we show that parameter uncertainty, or estimation risk, can have an effect upon market equilibrium. Under reasonable conditions, securities for which there is relatively little information are shown to have relatively higher systematic risk when that risk is properly measured, ceteris paribus. The initially very limited model is shown to be robust with respect to relaxation of a number of its principal assumptions. We provide theoretical support for the empirical examination of at least three proxies for relative information: period of listing, number of security returns observations available, and divergence of analyst opinion.

In this paper some effects of nonstationary parameters upon inferences and decisions in portfolio analysis are investigated. A Bayesian inferential model with nonstationary parameters is presented and is applied to the problem of portfolio choice. For this model, nonstationarity 1) implies greater uncertainty about future returns; 2) implies that in forecasting future returns, recent returns should receive more weight than not-so-recent returns; 3) restricts the amount of information that can be obtained about future values of the parameters of interest; 4) shifts investment among risky securities and from risky securities to risk-free securities; and 5) yields optimal portfolios with smaller expected returns than corresponding optimal portfolios in the stationary case.

We examine the roles of two financial intermediaries, lenders and venture capitalists, in a sample of more than 6000 IPO firms during 1980–2012. Venture capitalists and lenders generally fund different types of firms and, on average, are substitutes; however, in some instances we observe interactions and complementary roles between the two funding sources. Firms with high debt have lower valuation uncertainty, and lower initial day returns than those backed by venture capital. However, firms with high debt levels underperform in the long-run, especially those without venture capital. We provide some evidence that firms backed by reputable venture capitalists perform better.

We examine an exhaustive set of initial public offerings (IPOs) by venture-capital-backed companies between 1978 and 1987. We find that venture capitalists specialize their investments in firms to provide intensive monitoring services. Consistent with their monitoring role, the venture capitalists take concentrated equity positions, maintain their investment beyond the IPO, and serve on the boards of their portfolio firms. The quality of their monitoring services appears to be recognized by capital markets through lower underpricing for IPOs with better monitors.

Stephen J. Brown, Christopher B. Barry, Anomalies in Security Returns and the Specification of the Market Model, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings, Forty-Second Annual Meeting, American Finance Association, San Francisco, CA, December 28-30, 1983 (Jul., 1984), pp. 807-815

ABSTRACT We examine the hypothesis originally advanced by Roll [12] that observed anomalies in excess returns can be explained by misspecification of the market model used to estimate systematic risk. We find substantial misspecifications in the model systematically related to size and period of listing of the securities in question. There is some evidence that these misspecifications are associated with systemic biases in measured betas used to construct excess returns.

This paper addresses the investor's decision to employ multiple managers for the management of investment funds. Under conditions such that specialization of managers and diversification among managers are not motives for the use of multiple managers, the paper shows that risk sharing considerations may be sufficient. A model is developed in which the decision to use multiple managers is explicitly treated, and conditions are studied such that an increase or decrease in the number of managers would be desirable. Under some conditions, a multiple manager solution is preferred over a single manager solution.

ABSTRACT This paper addresses the investor's decision to employ multiple managers for the management of investment funds. Under conditions such that specialization of managers and diversification among managers are not motives for the use of multiple managers, the paper shows that risk sharing considerations may be sufficient. A model is developed in which the decision to use multiple managers is explicitly treated, and conditions are studied such that an increase or decrease in the number of managers would be desirable. Under some conditions, a multiple manager solution is preferred over a single manager solution.