This paper examines the policy issues associated with resolving the possible failure of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (housing enterprises). It compares and contrasts these issues with those raised in the context of large bank failures and also identifies important differences in the extant supervisory authorities. Based on these discussions, a number of policy suggestions are offered to minimize the cost of resolution and protect taxpayers from loss should a large bank or housing enterprise fail.

This paper documents strong evidence for behavioral biases among Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders and investigates the effect these biases have on prices. Our traders appear highly loss‐averse, regularly assuming above‐average afternoon risk to recover from morning losses. This behavior has important short‐term consequences for afternoon prices, as losing traders actively purchase contracts at higher prices and sell contracts at lower prices than those that prevailed previously. However, the market appears to distinguish these risk‐seeking trades from informed trading. Prices set by loss‐averse traders are reversed significantly more quickly than those set by unbiased traders.

We show analytically that in a rational expectations present‐value model, an asset price manifests near–random walk behavior if fundamentals are I(1) and the factor for discounting future fundamentals is near one. We argue that this result helps explain the well‐known puzzle that fundamental variables such as relative money supplies, outputs, inflation, and interest rates provide little help in predicting changes in floating exchange rates. As well, we show that the data do exhibit a related link suggested by standard models—that the exchange rate helps predict these fundamentals. The implication is that exchange rates and fundamentals are linked in a way that is broadly consistent with asset‐pricing models of the exchange rate.

Applying a Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)/Degeorge et al. (1999) type methodology to quarterly data for the 1985–2002 time period, we show that, since the mid-1990s, but not before then, managers seek to avoid negative quarterly earnings surprises more than to avoid either quarterly losses or quarterly earnings decreases. Our findings suggest that the quarterly earnings threshold hierarchy proposed by Degeorge et al. (1999) does not apply to recent years, and that managers' claim that avoiding quarterly earnings decreases is the threshold they most seek to achieve (Graham et al. 2004) is inconsistent with their actions. We provide an intuitively appealing economic rationale for why the shift in threshold hierarchy occurred; since the mid-1990s, but not before then, investors unambiguously rewarded (penalized) firms for reporting quarterly earnings meeting (missing) analysts' estimates more than they did for meeting (missing) the other two thresholds. We provide several explanations for why investors unambiguously reward firms for reporting quarterly earnings that meet or beat analysts' estimates more than for meeting the other two thresholds late (but not early) in our sample period: increased media coverage given to analyst forecasts, more analyst following, more firms covered by analysts, and temporal increases in both the accuracy and precision of analyst forecasts.

This study adds to the empirical evidence that privatization improves the performance of divested firms and offers preliminary evidence as to why these performance improvements occur. Using a sample of 129 share-issue privatizations from 23 developed (OECD) countries, we first document significant increases in profitability, efficiency, output, and capital expenditure following privatization. Our data indicate that ownership (both private and foreign), degree of economic freedom, and level of capital market development significantly affect post-privatization performance. A comparison to the findings of Boubakri et al. (2005) [Boubakri, N., Cosset, J., Guedmani, O., 2005. Liberalization, corporate governance, and the performance of newly privatized firms. Journal of Corporate Finance (this issue)] suggests that several determinants of post-privatization performance improvements differ between developed and developing countries.

The federal government spends billions of dollars each year on programs designed to increase the resources available to hospitals that serve the poor. This paper explores the intended and unintended effects of such targeted funds. First, how do these funds distort the behavior of state and local governments who wish to appropriate the funds for other uses? Second, to the extent that these funds do increase resources in the targeted hospitals, do patients benefit? We use the rapid and uneven growth in Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments across states and hospitals to answer these questions. We identify states that were most able to appropriate DSH funds and show that, while DSH payments to public hospitals in these states were systematically diverted, DSH payments to other hospitals and in other states were not diverted. Additional resources that were made available to hospitals (rather than appropriated by the state) were associated with significant declines in infant and post-heart attack mortality. A range of evidence suggests that these improvements were due to better hospital care. Overall, our analysis implies that public subsidies can be an effective mechanism for improving medical care and outcomes for the poor, but that the impact is limited by the ability of state and local government to divert the targeted funds.

This paper documents that insiders are both contrarians and possessors of superior information. We find that insider trades are positively related to the firm's future earnings performance (proxy for superior cash flow information), positively related to the firm's book-to-market ratio and inversely related to recent returns (proxies for trading against misvaluation). Each relation has incremental explanatory power, yet information about future cash flow changes explains a smaller portion of insider purchases than do proxies for security misvaluation. The relation between insider trades and future earnings performance is amplified (attenuated) as the benefits (costs) to trading on financial performance information increase.

I extend prior research on the information content of conference calls by examining whether they accelerate analysts' and investors' responses to the future implications of currently announced earnings. I find that the initiation of conference calls is associated with a significant reduction in the serial correlation in analyst forecast errors, a measure of initial analyst underreaction. I also find that the initiation of conference calls is associated with significant reductions in two measures of initial investor underreaction: (1) post-earnings announcement drift and (2) the proportion of the total market reaction to firms' earnings announcements that is “delayed” (i.e., that is attributable to post-earnings announcement drift). The reduction in post-earnings announcement drift surrounding conference call initiation is concentrated in the set of sample firms where drift is most severe (i.e., the smallest, least heavily traded sample firms) while the largest, most heavily traded sample firms do not exhibit significant drift either before or after conference call initiation. Robustness tests, including analyses of matched samples of nonconference call firms, indicate that the results are not driven by general increases in analyst and investor sophistication over time or by contemporaneous increases in the information and trading environments of conference call initiators.

This paper proposes a new framework for understanding financial intermediation. In contrast to previous research, we consider a setting in which intermediaries possess no inherent information processing or monitoring advantages. Instead, in an economy with overly optimistic entrepreneurs who require funding from pessimistic investors, we show that intermediaries can arise endogenously. In such a setting, only a rational intermediary will be sufficiently optimistic to find it worthwhile to invest in a technology for screening entrepreneurs' projects, and yet be pessimistic enough to use this technology. Our framework produces implications consistent with heretofore unexplained stylized facts, and conjectures which are thus far untested.

We examine the influence of corporate taxes on U.S. firms' financing methods for taxable acquisitions of 100 percent of a target corporation's stock. We conduct tests of acquirer firms' use of debt or internal funds as the funding source for these acquisitions over the period 1987‐97. Our results provide the first empirical evidence that U.S. firms' use of debt to fund acquisitions significantly declines as foreign tax credit limitations reduce the marginal tax benefits received from borrowing. This finding is consistent with earlier speculation that U.S. foreign tax credit provisions could materially affect the capital costs of U.S. companies in debt‐financed acquisitions. We also find that these firms are generally high‐tax‐rate corporations whose financing choices are not significantly influenced by whether they acquire target‐firm tax loss carryovers. Our findings contribute to the accounting literature on the influence of taxes on the structure and financing of corporate acquisitions.