We develop a model in which individual and institutional reputation concerns conflict with one another to study why investment bank reputation concerns may have diminished in recent years. Unproven but talented bankers have incentive to signal their ability through actions that may or may not best serve their clients. In the spirit of Kreps (1990), we treat the bank as a hierarchical firm whose only asset is its institutional reputation for curbing behavior that is suboptimal for the client. The conflict between individual and institutional reputation concerns is more likely to resolve in favor of institutional reputation when firms recruit only the most talented people, and less so when unique ability is especially valuable. We discuss how technological change has contributed to a “star” culture that is unfavorable toward preservation of institutional reputation.

I study the impact of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy and resultant inability to honor its obligations as a lender under committed credit lines. Firms that lost access to a credit line committed by Lehman Brothers experienced abnormal stock returns of −3%, on average, on the day of and day after Lehman's bankruptcy filing, amounting to roughly $5.7 billion in aggregate, risk-adjusted losses. These losses were significantly larger for firms that were more financially constrained, firms with less cash, firms for whom Lehman was a lead-bank, and firms that lost access to larger amounts of committed credit. During the four quarters immediately following Lehman's collapse, firms that lost access to a credit line cut their investment spending significantly while simultaneously hoarding more cash than comparable firms. Overall, these findings indicate that firms that lost access to a credit line incurred economically significant costs and real-side consequences as a result of Lehman's default on its loan commitments.

We investigate an asset pricing model with preferences cycling between high risk aversion and low EIS in fall/winter and the reverse in spring/summer. Calibrating to consumption data and allowing plausible preference parameter values, we produce returns that match observed equity and Treasury returns across the seasons: risky returns are higher and risk-free returns are lower or stable in fall/winter, and they reverse in spring/summer. Further, risky returns vary more than risk-free returns. A novel finding is that both EIS and risk aversion must vary seasonally to match observed returns. Further, the degree of necessary seasonal change in EIS is small.

We examine proprietary research produced by buy‐side analysts working for a large fund management company. We find that the buy‐side research has investment value for a one‐year horizon, and the analysts producing this research exhibit differential ability that tends to persist over time. The buy‐side research strongly influences trades made by the company's funds, especially when it coveys information that is independent of the fund managers' own information, when it is produced by buy‐side analysts with good track records, and when the underlying stocks have little sell‐side coverage. The influence of sell‐side research is concentrated primarily in stocks not followed by buy‐side analysts and in funds with low overall buy‐side coverage. The company's funds that rely more heavily on buy‐side research generate superior performance.

We observe a persistent increase in the percentage of firms with little or no debt in their capital structure over the last three decades. The fraction of firms with less than five percent debt in their capital structure increases from 14.01 percent in 1977 to 34.42 percent in 2010 while the percentage of all-equity firms increases 200 percent over the same period. We find that even after controlling for firm- and industry-specific variables that are relevant to capital structure policy, there is a deficiency in firms' propensity to be levered. Additionally, the deficiency is increasing over time and by 2010 the percent of firms that are nearly all-equity is twice the predicted level. Our findings are robust to different methodologies, specifications, and time periods. Overall, these results suggest that the well-documented benefits of leverage are less valuable over the sample period and that the determinants of firms' capital structure decisions have evolved since the 1970s.

We use micro data on Irish producer prices to provide clean evidence on pricing-to-market across a broad range of manufacturing sectors. We have monthly observations on prices charged by the same plant for the same product to buyers in Ireland and the UK, two markets segmented by variable exchange rates. Assuming that relative marginal cost is constant across markets within a plant and a product, this allows us to observe the behaviour of the markup in the UK market relative to the home market. To identify pricing-to-market that goes beyond what is mechanically due to price stickiness, we condition on episodes where prices change. When prices are invoiced in local currency, conditional on prices changing, the ratio of the markup in the foreign market to the markup in the home market increases one-for-one with depreciations of home against foreign currency and decreases one-for-one with appreciations of home against foreign currency, a very particular form of pricing-to-market.

We develop two measures of board composition to investigate whether directors appointed by the CEO have allegiance to the CEO and decrease their monitoring. Co-option is the fraction of the board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. As Co-option increases, board monitoring decreases: turnover-performance sensitivity diminishes, pay increases (without commensurate increase in pay-performance sensitivity), and investment increases. Non-Co-opted Independence—the fraction of directors who are independent and were appointed before the CEO—has more explanatory power for monitoring effectiveness than the conventional measure of board independence. Our results suggest that not all independent directors are effective monitors.

The present study builds upon the seminal work of Engel and West (2005) and in particular on the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals. The paper discusses the well-known puzzle that fundamental variables such as money supply and interest rate, provide help in predicting changes in floating rates. It also tests the theoretical result of Engel and West (2005) that in a rational expectations present-value model, the asset price manifests near-random walk behaviour if the fundamentals are I(1) and the factor for discounting future fundamentals is near one. The study explores the direction and nature of causal interdependencies among the most widely traded currencies in the world, their country-specific fundamentals and their US-differentials. A new VAR/VECM-GARCH multivariate filtering approach is implemented, whilst linear and nonlinear non-causality is tested and validated on simulated and empirical data. The evidence implies that there is no indication of a prevailing causal behaviour and when nonlinear effects are accounted for, the pattern of leads and lags changes over time. The variations in this linkage can be attributed to parameter instability in structural models, which may have little effect on FX forecastability over short horizons, yet it is significant for long-run cointegrating relationships. While it is difficult to reconcile these findings with the Rational Expectations hypothesis, the theory of Consistent Expectations or Bounded Rationality matches simulation and empirical findings more efficiently. Overall, fundamentals may be important determinants of FX rates, however there may be some other unobservable variables driving the currency rates that current asset-pricing models have not yet captured.