This paper examines the missing transmission mechanism in Friedman's and Schwartz's monetary explanation of the Great Depression. We review the challenge provided by the decline in nominal interest rates in the early 1930s, and show that the monetary explanation requires not just that there were expectations of deflation, but that they were caused by monetary contraction. Using a detailed analysis of Business Week magazine, we find evidence that monetary contraction and Federal Reserve policy contributed to expectations of deflation during the downturn. This suggests that monetary shocks may have depressed spending and output in part by raising real interest rates.

Monetary policy-makers' beliefs about how the economy functions are a key determinant of the conduct of policy. That monetary policy has little impact under the prevailing circumstances is a belief which has resurfaced periodically over the Federal Reserve's 100-year history. In both the 1930s and the 1970s a belief in the ineffectiveness of monetary policy led to policy inaction and poor economic outcomes. For some of the recent period, the same view appears to have limited the policy response to prolonged high unemployment in the presence of low inflation.

This paper investigates the impact of tax changes on economic activity. We use the narrative record, such as presidential speeches and Congressional reports, to identify the size, timing, and principal motivation for all major postwar tax policy actions. This analysis allows us to separate legislated changes into those taken for reasons related to prospective economic conditions and those taken for more exogenous reasons. The behavior of output following these more exogenous changes indicates that tax increases are highly contractionary. The effects are strongly significant, highly robust, and much larger than those obtained using broader measures of tax changes.

A key issue in monetary policymaking is the appropriate division of labor between the profes? sional staff of the central bank and the appointed policymakers. Lars E. O. Svensson (1999) argues that the appropriate role of a policymaking group, such as the Federal Open Market Com? mittee (FOMC) in the United States, is to make judgments about social welfare, taking as given the likely outcomes of different policies as esti? mated by the staff. In this division, the staff is relied upon to assess current and prospective economic conditions and to forecast the effects of different policies. Policymakers' only role is to decide which of the various options should be chosen.

This paper develops a measure of U.S. monetary policy shocks for the period 1969–1996 that is relatively free of endogenous and anticipatory movements. Quantitative and narrative records are used to infer the Federal Reserve's intentions for the federal funds rate around FOMC meetings. This series is regressed on the Federal Reserve's internal forecasts to derive a measure free of systematic responses to information about future developments. Estimates using the new measure indicate that policy has large, relatively rapid, and statistically significant effects on both output and inflation. The effects are substantially stronger and quicker than those obtained using conventional indicators.

Monetary policy in the United States in the 1950s was remarkably modern. Analysis of Federal Reserve records shows that policymakers had an overarching aversion to inflation and were willing to accept significant costs to prevent it from rising to even moderate levels. This aversion to inflation was the result of policymakers' beliefs that higher inflation could not raise output in the long run, that the level of output that would trigger increases in inflation was only moderate, and that inflation had large real costs in the medium and long runs. Furthermore, both narrative and empirical analysis indicates that policymakers were not wedded to free reserves or other faulty indicators in their implementation of policy. Empirical estimates of a forward-looking Taylor rule show that policymakers in the 1950s raised nominal interest rates more than one-for-one with increases in expected inflation, and suggests that monetary policy in the 1950s was more similar to policy in the 1980s and 1990s than to that in the late 1960s and 1970s. One implication of these findings is that the inflation of the late 1960s and 1970s must have been the result of a change in the conduct of policy.

This paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the Federal Reserve and the public by examining Federal Reserve and commercial inflation forecasts. It demonstrates that the Federal Reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters. It also shows that monetary-policy actions provide signals of the Federal Reserve's information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals. These findings may explain why long-term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy.

This paper examines whether the Solow growth model is consistent with the international variation in the standard of living. It shows that an augmented Solow model that includes accumulation of human as well as physical capital provides an excellent description of the cross-country data. The paper also examines the implications of the Solow model for convergence in standards of living, that is, for whether poor countries tend to grow faster than rich countries. The evidence indicates that, holding population growth and capital accumulation constant, countries converge at about the rate the augmented Solow model predicts.