This paper considers equilibrium quit turnover in a frictional labor market with costly hiring by firms, where large firms employ many workers and face both aggregate and firm specific productivity shocks. There is exogenous firm turnover as new (small) startups enter the market over time, while some existing firms fail and exit. Individual firm growth rates are disperse and evolve stochastically. The paper highlights how dynamic monopsony, where firms trade off lower wages against higher (endogenous) employee quit rates, yields excessive job-to-job quits. Such quits directly crowd out the reemployment prospects of the unemployed. With finite firm productivity states, stochastic equilibrium is fully tractable and can be computed using standard numerical techniques.

Productivity differences across firms are large and persistent, but the evidence for worker reallocation as an important source of aggregate productivity growth is mixed. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the structure of an equilibrium model of growth through innovation designed to identify and quantify the role of resource reallocation in the growth process. The model is a version of the Schumpeterian theory of firm evolution and growth developed by Klette and Kortum (2004) extended to allow for firm heterogeneity. The data set is a panel of Danish firms that includes information on value added, employment, and wages. The model's fit is good. The estimated model implies that more productive firms in each cohort grow faster and consequently crowd out less productive firms in steady state. This selection effect accounts for 53% of aggregate growth in the estimated version of the model.

This article investigates the consequences of labor market search for the theory of hedonic wages. We find that the introduction of search has surprising consequences for the theory of hedonic wages. In particular, we demonstrate that the equilibrium distribution of wage and nonwage amenity bundles generally bears little resemblance to workers' underlying preferences. A consequence of this analysis is that estimates of workers' marginal willingness to pay, derived from the conventional hedonic wage methodology, are biased. In addition, we demonstrate that search generates differences between firm‐level and employee‐level data that can cause substantial deviations in the estimates of hedonic wage equations.

The article structually estimates an on‐the‐job search model of job separations. Given each employer pays observably equivalent workers the same but wages are dispersed across employers, an employer's separation flow is the sum of an exogenous outflow unrelated to the wage and a job‐to‐job flow that decreases with the employer's wage. Using data from the Danish Integrated Database for Labour Market Research, the empirical results imply, as predicted by theory, that search effort declines with the wage. Furthermore, the estimates explain the employment effect, defined as the horizontal difference between the distribution of wages earned and the wage offer distribution.