This article develops a multi-factor econometric model of the term structure of interest-rate swap yields. The model accommodates the possibility of counterparty default, and any differences in the liquidities of the Treasury and Swap markets. By parameterizing a model of swap rates directly, the authors are able to compute model-based estimates of the defaultable zero-coupon bond rates implicit in the swap market without having to specify a priori the dependence of these rates on default hazard or recovery rates. The time series analysis of spreads between zero-coupon swap and treasury yields reveals that both credit and liquidity factors were important sources of variation in swap spreads over the past decade.

Empirical difficulties encountered by representative-consumer models are resolved in an economy with heterogeneity in the form of uninsurable, persistent, and heteroscedastic labor income shocks. Given the joint process of arbitrage-free asset prices, dividends, and aggregate income, satisfying a certain joint restriction, it is shown that this process is supported in the equilibrium of an economy with judiciously modeled income heterogeneity. The Euler equations of consumption in a representative-agent economy are replaced by a set of Euler equations that depend not only on the per capita consumption growth but also on the cross-sectional variance of the individual consumers' consumption growth.

Stochastic equilibria under uncertainty with continuous-time security trading and consumption are demonstrated in a general setting. A common question is whether the current price of a security is an unbiased predictor of the future price of the security plus intermediate dividends. This is the hypothesis of expected financial gains from trade. The relevance of this hypothesis in multi-good economies is called into question by the following demonstrated fact. For each set of probability assessments there exists a corresponding equilibrium, one with the original agents, original equilibrium allocations, and no expected financial gains from trade under the given probability assessments. The spanning number of the economy is defined as the fewest number of security markets required to sustain a complete markets equilibrium (in a dynamic sense made precise in the paper). The spanning number is linked directly to agent primitives, in particular the manner in which new information resolves uncertainty over time. The spanning number is shown to be invariant under bounded changes in expectations. Several examples are given in which the spanning number is finite even though the number of potential states of the world is infinite.

This article combines an orientation to credit risk modeling with an introduction to affine Markov processes, which are particularly useful for financial modeling. We emphasize corporate credit risk and the pricing of credit derivatives. Applications of affine processes that are mentioned include survival analysis, dynamic term-structure models, and option pricing with stochastic volatility and jumps. The default-risk applications include default correlation, particularly in first-to-default settings. The reader is assumed to have some background in financial modeling and stochastic calculus.

[We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under certain conditions, illiquidity discounts are higher when counterparties are harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fraction of qualified owners is smaller, or when risk aversion, volatility, or hedging demand is larger. Supply shocks cause prices to jump, and then "recover" over time, with a time signature that is exaggerated by search frictions: The price jump is larger and the recovery is slower in less liquid markets. We discuss a variety of empirical implications.]

ABSTRACT I describe asset price dynamics caused by the slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities. The pattern of price responses to supply or demand shocks typically involves a sharp reaction to the shock and a subsequent and more extended reversal. The amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect institutional impediments to immediate trade, such as search costs for trading counterparties or time to raise capital by intermediaries. I discuss special impediments to capital formation during the recent financial crisis that caused asset price distortions, which subsided afterward. After presenting examples of price reactions to supply shocks in normal market settings, I offer a simple illustrative model of price dynamics associated with slow‐moving capital due to the presence of inattentive investors.

This article provides the causes and symptoms of special repo rates in a competitive market for repurchase agreements. A repo rate is, in effect, an interest rate on loans collateralized by a specific instrument. A “special” is a repo rate significantly below prevailing market riskless interest rates. This article shows that specials can occur when those owning the collateral are inhibited, whether from legal or institutional requirements or from frictional costs, from supplying collateral into repurchase agreements. Specialness increases the equilibrium price for the underlying instrument by the present value of savings in borrowing costs associated with the repo specials.

ABSTRACT This article provides the causes and symptoms of special repo rates in a competitive market for repurchase agreements. A repo rate is, in effect, an interest rate on loans collateralized by a specific instrument. A “special” is a repo rate significantly below prevailing market riskless interest rates. This article shows that specials can occur when those owning the collateral are inhibited, whether from legal or institutional requirements or from frictional costs, from supplying collateral into repurchase agreements. Specialness increases the equilibrium price for the underlying instrument by the present value of savings in borrowing costs associated with the repo specials.

Abstract We explain how the common practice of size-discovery trade detracts from overall financial market efficiency. At each of a series of size-discovery sessions, traders report their desired trades, generating allocations of the asset and cash that rely on the most recent exchange price. Traders can thus mitigate exchange price impacts by waiting for size-discovery sessions. This waiting causes socially costly delays in the rebalancing of asset positions across traders. As the frequency of size-discovery sessions is increased, exchange market depth is further lowered by the traders’ reduced incentive to bid aggressively on the exchange, further delaying the rebalancing of positions, and more than offsetting the gains from trade that occur at each of the size-discovery sessions.