We study the relations between management contract terms and performance in private equity using new data for 837 funds from 1984–2010. We find no evidence that higher fees or lower managerial ownership are associated with lower net-of-fee performance. Nevertheless, compensation rises and shifts to performance-insensitive components during fundraising booms. Further, the behavior of distributions around contractual fee triggers is consistent with an underlying agency conflict between investors and fund managers. Our evidence suggests that managers with higher fees deliver higher gross performance, and highlights that agency costs are an inevitable consequence of the information frictions endemic to agency relationships.

We survey a large sample of Swedish households and connect the responses to administrative data to relate pro-environmental attitudes and values to actual investment decisions. Pro-environment households are not more likely to hold pro-environment portfolios. This results from financial disengagement: they are less likely to own stocks, check pension balances, or make green active retirement planning choices. Green financial engagement is stronger in settings where financial literacy is higher or where informational hurdles are lower. Informational barriers appear to prevent financial market prices and returns from fully reflecting household environmental preferences.

ABSTRACT We relate the property rights theory of the firm to empirical regularities in the market for mergers and acquisitions. We first show that high market‐to‐book acquirers typically do not purchase low market‐to‐book targets. Instead, mergers pair together firms with similar ratios. We then build a continuous‐time model of investment and merger activity combining search, scarcity, and asset complementarity to explain this like buys like result. We test the model by relating like‐buys‐like to search frictions. Search frictions and assortative matching vary inversely, supporting the model over standard explanations.

We measure financial literacy among LinkedIn members, complementing standard questions with additional questions that allow us to gauge self-perceptions of financial literacy. Average financial literacy is surprisingly low given the demographics of our sample: fewer than two-thirds of chief financial officers, chief executive officers, and chief operating officers complete the test correctly. Financial literacy, precautionary savings and retirement planning are positively correlated, but this is mostly driven by perceived, not actual, literacy: controlling for self-perceptions, actual literacy has low predictive power. Perceptions drive decision-making among low-literacy respondents and are associated with mistaken beliefs about financial products and less willingness to accept financial advice.

We study the trade-offs that biotech start-ups face in the private equity market when they choose between raising firm-level capital from venture capitalists or project-level capital from strategic alliance partners. Increased alliance activity makes future alliances more likely, but future VC activity less likely. In contrast, venture capital (VC) activity makes both future alliance and future VC activity more likely. Both types of private capital raise the hazard of going public. Acquisition as an alternative to initial public offering is made more likely by increased VC activity, but the link between acquisition probabilities and alliance activity is less clear-cut. These results highlight both the importance of alliance partners in resolving asymmetric information problems in the capital acquisition process and the potential conflict of interest between different sources of private equity.

To test recent theories suggesting that valuation errors affect merger activity, we develop a decomposition that breaks the market-to-book ratio (M/B) into three components: the firm-specific pricing deviation from short-run industry pricing; sector-wide, short-run deviations from firms’ long-run pricing; and long-run pricing to book. We find strong support for recent theories by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan [2004. Market valuation and merger waves. Journal of Finance, forthcoming] and Shleifer and Vishny [2003. Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 70, 295–311], which predict that misvaluation drives mergers. So much of the behavior of M/B is driven by firm-specific deviations from short-run industry pricing, that long-run components of M/B run counter to the conventional wisdom: Low long-run value to book firms buy high long-run value-to-book firms. Misvaluation affects who buys whom, as well as method of payment, and combines with neoclassical explanations to explain aggregate merger activity.

NO WORLD CENTRAL BANK issues a separate currency for commerce across national boundaries. Instead, a system of national monies works more or less well in providing a medium of exchange and unit of account for current international transactions, as well as a store of value and standard of deferred payment for longer-term borrowing and lending. How do national governments and banking institutions interact to provide international money for merchants and investors? By necessity, this monetary interaction changes with time, place, political circumstances, and financial technology. To better understand its historical evolution, let us follow Robert Mundell and distinguish between a monetary system and a monetary order:

Using data from a finance theme park at Junior Achievement of Southern California, we explore how timely decision support is impacted by previous exposure to financial education. Some students received a 19-hour curriculum before participating, and some did not. Trained students were more frugal, paid off debt faster, and relied less on credit financing. However, trained students purchased less comprehensive health insurance, exposing themselves to greater financial risk and wealth volatility. This disparity can be explained by differences in decision support within the park. As such, it appears that education and decision support should be considered complements, not substitutes.

ABSTRACT Firms in more concentrated industries earn lower returns, even after controlling for size, book‐to‐market, momentum, and other return determinants. Explanations based on chance, measurement error, capital structure, and persistent in‐sample cash flow shocks do not explain this finding. Drawing on work in industrial organization, we posit that either barriers to entry in highly concentrated industries insulate firms from undiversifiable distress risk, or firms in highly concentrated industries are less risky because they engage in less innovation, and thereby command lower expected returns. Additional time‐series tests support these risk‐based interpretations.

This article investigates sample selection bias in early-stage investment. We use comprehensive administrative data on the universe of new firm starts in Norway, allowing us to compare venture-backed firms with ex ante similar firms that do not receive venture funding. The valuation premium for venture backing is sizeable at firm birth and doubles over the first 5 years, implying a substantial upward bias in venture capital (VC) returns relative to comparable firms. In contrast, the premium for firms receiving multiple rounds of outside equity emerges only after the first year and remains significantly smaller than the VC premium throughout the firm life cycle.