The authors examine an economy with aggregate and idiosyncratic income risk in which agents cannot contract on future labor income. Agents trade financial securities to buffer idiosyncratic shocks but the extent of trade is limited by borrowing constraints and transactions costs. The effect of frictions on the equity premium is decomposed into two components: a direct effect due to the equation of net-of-costs margins and an indirect effect due to increased consumption volatility. Simulations suggest that the direct effect dominates and that the model predicts a sizable equity premium only if costs are large or the quantity of tradable assets is limited. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.

Robert A. Korajczyk, Deborah J. Lucas, Robert L. McDonald, Equity Issues with Time-Varying Asymmetric Information, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 397-417

With time-varying adverse selection in the market for new equity issues, firms will prefer to issue equity when the market is most informed about the quality of the firm. This implies that equity issues tend to follow credible information releases. In addition, if the asymmetry in information increases over time between information releases, the price drop at the announcement of an equity issue should increase in the time since the last information release. Using earnings releases as a proxy for informative events, we find evidence supporting these propositions.

Monetary models based on cash-in-advance constraints make strong predictions about the stochastic properties of endogeneous variables such as the velocity of circulation of money, the rate of inflation, and real and nominal interest rates. We develop numerical methods to understand these predictions because the models cannot be characterized analytically. We calibrate some cash-in-advance models using driving processes estimated from U. S. time-series data to generate model predictions that are compared to sample statistics. Formulations of the models that generate variability in velocity corresponding to the U.S. data typically fail along other dimensions.

This paper is based on a panel discussion at the international bank conference on Frontier Risks, Financial Innovation and Prudential Regulation of Banks in Gothenburg, Sweden, June 2–4, 2024. The panelists were Deborah Lucas, Jan Pieter Krahnen, and Magnus Olsson, with Ted Lindblom moderating. This paper contains the panel presentations, along with a unifying discussion by Paolo Fulghieri and Anjan Thakor. The main themes in the paper focus on how society should balance costs and benefits in designing the prudential regulation of banks. Optimal regulation should take into account how banks and markets interact, the dangers of both under-regulation that spawns excessive risk-taking and over-regulation that depresses value-enhancing innovation in financial services, the somewhat fragmented nature of national-sovereignty-constrained European banking and financial markets regulation relative to bank regulation in the US, and how prudential regulation can be improved by more explicitly dealing with interest rate risk.