A growing body of evidence indicates that liquidity constraints could affect a substantial proportion of U. S. consumers, but little is known about why these constraints might exist. An important, but little-explored, issue is the relationship between inter vivos intergenerational transfers and liquidity constraints. These transfers can ease borrowing constraints. Empirical transfer patterns match those predicted from a model in which transfers are allocated to liquidity-constrained consumers. In particular, the distinction between current and permanent incomes of potential recipients is a key aspect of private-transfer behavior. The findings have important implications for our understanding of consumer behavior.

In 1982, Dimensional Fund Advisors launched a mutual fund intended to capture the returns of small-cap stocks. The ‘9–10 Fund’ is based on the CRSP 9–10 Index, an index of small-cap stocks constituting the ninth and tenth deciles of NYSE market capitalization, although the 9–10 Fund incorporates investment rules and a trading strategy that are aimed at minimizing the potentially excessive trade costs associated with such illiquid stocks. As a result, the 9–10 Fund provided a 2.2% annual premium over the 9–10 Index for the 1982–1995 period. We show that both the investment rules and the trade strategy components of the Fund’s design contribute significantly to this return difference.

Returns computed with closing bid or ask prices that may not represent ‘true’ prices introduce measurement error into portfolio returns if investor buying and selling display systematic patterns. This paper finds systematic tendencies for closing prices to be recorded at the bid in December and at the ask in early January. After changing bid and ask prices are controlled for. this pattern results in large portfolio returns on the two trading days surrounding the end of the year, especially for low-price stocks. Other temporal return patterns (e.g. weekend and holiday effects) are also related to systematic trading patterns.

This study examines, month-by-month, the empirical relation between abnormal returns and market value of NYSE and AMEX common stocks. Evidence is provided that daily abnormal return distributions in January have large means relative to the remaining eleven months, and that the relation between abnormal returns and size is always negative and more pronounced in January than in any other month — even in years when, on average, large firms earn larger risk-adjusted returns than small firms. In particular, nearly fifty percent of the average magnitude of the ‘size effect’ over the period 1963–1979 is due to January abnormal returns. Further, more than fifty percent of the January premium is attributable to large abnormal returns during the first week of trading in the year, particularly on the first trading day.

Owners of capital frequently lack knowledge about investment opportunities. One alternative is to turn to a manager for assistance. The owner's problem of contracting for the services of a manager is treated as a problem in buying information. The surprising result is that it is sometimes possible to trade information even when the owner is unable to form his own assessment of the information's value. Under some conditions it is possible to write a managerial compensation contract which will induce the manager to act in the best interests of the owner. These conditions require owner knowledge of the manager's employment and investment alternatives and risk preferences as well as some, but not all, of the characteristics of the investment opportunities.

Journal Article Algorithms for Social Choice Functions Get access Donald E. Campbell Donald E. Campbell Ontario Economic Council and University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 47, Issue 3, April 1980, Pages 617–627, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297312 Published: 01 April 1980 Article history Received: 01 June 1977 Accepted: 01 April 1979 Published: 01 April 1980

Journal Article A General Equilibrium Analysis of Trade Creating Customs Unions Get access Donald M. Chaffee, Jr Donald M. Chaffee, Jr San Francisco State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 42, Issue 2, April 1975, Pages 279–284, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296535 Published: 01 April 1975

Structural reforms of a fundamental nature now under way in Wall Street have been proclaimed so often of late as to become commonplace. The fact that many of these changes are not welcomed by established and influential persons who make their living in or around Wall Street is not news. What may be news, however, is that neither of these facts is particularly new.

Donald G. Simonson, Comment: The Predictive Content of some Leading Economic Indicators for Future Stock Prices, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Mar., 1974), pp. 259-261

The FTC reported 22, 517 corporate acquisitions during the 1960s compared with 7200 for the period, 1940–1959. The increased employment of this method of corporate growth has generated a number of studies explaining certain segments of the merger movement. Attempts have been made to explain why firms merge, how firms merge, and how mergers have affected subsequent performance of firms. Mergers have been described as consummated to avoid bankruptcy (for the acquired firm), to capitalize upon managerial inefficiencies, to gain from valuation discrepancies, to achieve portfolio diversification, and for synergistic purposes and many other reasons.