Survey assessments have found limited evidence of benefits of executive attractiveness. We use an objective measure of facial attractiveness that is correlated with survey assessments but less noisy and identify several benefits from executive facial attractiveness previously found in the general population but heretofore empirically elusive among executives. We examine the effect of both measures on executive compensation, promotion to CEO and the corresponding shareholder reaction, and promotion to board chair. The objective measure identifies significantly positive labor market effects for executive attractiveness in all outcomes in contrast to survey assessments of attractiveness that do not correlate with any outcome.

Why do firms deviate from a one share-one vote regime when going public? This question raises considerations that are at the core of many corporate governance issues. We consider three arguments for this choice. Examining data on IPOs from 1980 through 2008, we do not find that firms go public with dual class stock so managers have more incentive to invest in hard to monitor projects nor to gain more when selling control of the firm. Rather, managers appear to take their firms public with dual class stock in order to retain control of their firms while reducing their lack of diversification costs.

The announcement of a bank loan by a borrowing firm has been shown to have a positive effect on the market value of the borrower’s claims. This is consistent with a lender’s implied endorsement of the borrower––an endorsement that has value to the borrower. In this paper, we investigate whether the lender is able to extract a premium loan rate or certification premium in return. We find empirical evidence that in the absence of collateral reputable lenders are able to exact a certification premium.

Studies have analyzed the impact of firm and issue characteristics but not liquidity and solvency components of financial distress on the use of bond covenants. Using a comprehensive database of corporate bonds from 2001 to 2012, we find that firm liquidity, measured by standardized Lambda, has a negative statistical and economic impact on the inclusion of all categories and sub-categories of restrictive bond covenants. Developed from financial statement information by Emery and Lyons (1991), Lambda is designed as a coverage ratio that, under certain distribution assumptions, maps into the probability of a firm being unable to pay its short-term bills. The strongest solvency proxy is the 10-year credit default swap (CDS) spread which is significant across the categories and sub-categories for investment and payment covenants, weakly significant for the subordinated debt sub-category of the subsequent financing covenant, but strongly significant for the control poison put sub-category of event covenants. This evidence supports a model that uses SLambda as a proxy for liquidity risk and the 10-year CDS spread as a proxy for solvency risk. The liquidity/covenant relationship is dampened when firms have access to commercial paper funding or bank loans. However, during the recent financial crisis liquidity event this liquidity/covenant relationship was enhanced especially for firms which were dependent on commercial paper during this time when the commercial paper market was deteriorating.

We study corporate governance within the thrift industry during a period of industry distress and legally mandated regulatory vigilance. We find evidence consistent with the Office of Thrift Supervision displacing the disciplinary role of takeovers in the market for thrift control. Poorer prior thrift performance is associated with a greater likelihood of censure while better prior performance is associated with a greater likelihood of acquisition. For thrifts that are not censured or acquired, there is no relationship between current performance and managerial turnover. Replacement due to retirement rather than board discipline explains most of these turnovers. This result is consistent with the notion that regulation may deter board disciplinary behavior, also suggested by Kole and Lehr [Journal of Financial Economics 52 (1999) 79].

Derrien [2005. Journal of Finance 60, 487–521] and Ljungqvist et al. [2006. Journal of Business] build upon the work of Miller [1977. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] and claim that issuers and the regular customers of investment bankers benefit from the presence of sentiment investors (noise traders) in the market for an initial public offering (IPO). Thus we argue that investment bankers have an incentive to promote an IPO to induce sentiment investors into the market for it. Consistent with this motivation and these models, we expect that the promotional efforts of investment bankers should influence the compensation of investment bankers, the valuation of an IPO, its initial returns and trading, the wealth gains of insider shareholders, and the likelihood that an issuer switches investment bankers for a subsequent seasoned equity offering. Examining data for a sample of IPOs from 1993 through 2000, we find evidence consistent with these predictions and so with the proposition that an investment banker's ability to market an IPO to sentiment investors is important.

Our study addresses two issues overlooked in prior research: Does a firm's future operating lease obligations influence its current cash holdings? Does this relationship contribute to the temporal increase in corporate cash holdings? We provide evidence that these future obligations significantly influence a firm's cash holdings and contribute to the temporal increase in U.S. corporate cash holdings. Consequently, our findings are consistent with the options offered by operating leases to young growing firms and the effect of these operating lease obligations on the firm's operating leverage.

ABSTRACT Brennan and Franks (1997) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) provide contrasting arguments for why monitoring considerations create incentives for managers to underprice their firms' IPOs (initial public offerings). Like Smart and Zutter (2003) , we examine these arguments using a sample of U.S. IPOs. However, we find evidence that the determinants of initial returns, institutional shareholdings, and post‐IPO likelihood of acquisition are not consistent with these arguments. Thus, we conclude that monitoring considerations are not important determinants of IPO underpricing.