E. S. Phelps, R. A. Pollak; On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth1, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 35, Issue 2, 1 April 1968,

The purpose of this paper is to estimate empirically the effect of the deferred call provisions on corporate bond yields using the conceptual framework of callable and call-free yields developed by Jen and Wert [3]. After reviewing briefly the above-mentioned study in Section I, Section II presents patterns of callable and call-free yields of deferred issues from January 1956 to June 1961 by grades, months of offering, and coupon rates and contrasts them with those of the freely callable issues. Section III further contrasts yields of deferred issues with those of freely-callable ones on a pair comparison basis, while Section IV discusses the implication of the study for both the issuers and the investors.

Corporations tender for their own shares for a variety of reasons. Some stock tenders are made for strategic purposes—to prevent a take-over, to raise the market price of the stock, or simply because the stock represents ‘a good investment.’ For discussion of tendering in these situations, see the articles of Ellis [2] and Guthart [1]. In addition, there may be tactical reasons for a stock tender; one such reason is to reduce bookkeeping and shareholder servicing costs. In this instance, the argument runs roughly as follows: “The annual cost of servicing a holding is independent of the number of shares; consequently, the cost per share of servicing small holdings is relatively great. Let us reduce these high per-share costs by buying up small holdings.” Typical procedure is to then mail out an offer to buy holdings of less than a certain size directly, thus permitting the shareholder to dispose of his holding without paying the usual brokerage and odd-lot fees. Frequently no premium is offered except for the avoidance of brokerage fees. If one were to consider the premium offered as a controllable variable, it would be surprising to discover that its optimal value were exactly zero. One also recognizes that the maximum shareholding tendered for may be another decision variable available for optimization. See the appendix for data on tenders of this sort made in recent years. The variety of policies seems to indicate an almost complete absence of systematic application of the ideas presented here.

A new system of inequality indicators is introduced in the paper. It has been elaborated for measuring income inequalities, but can serve as inequality measures for other phenomena as well. The new indicators not only measure the degree of the inequality but are also suitable for measuring its economic motivation. Properties of the new measures, including large sample properties of their estimators, are discussed. The case of the lognormal distribution is of special interest. ONE OF THE methodological problems that have recently arisen in planning consists in forecasting the personal income distribution of the population for some future period. To tackle this problem an experimental simulation model has been worked out by the authors at the Hungarian Planning Office [5,6]. The chief aim of this model is to trace, on a sample of households selected at random, the influence of certain economic and demographic phenomena on the income distribution of the population living on wages and salaries. This study deals not with the special problems of these model procedures, e.g. the follow up of changes in wages and salaries, family allowances, pensions, employment, and demographic variables, etc. (being consistent with the plans of national economy). Instead we wish to give some information about our tools of measurement for analyzing the degree and the causes of the inequalities of factual and simulated income distributions. In other words, in connection with this simulation experiment we needed measures which, besides indicating the effect of the various plan variants on income inequality, provided us the opportunity for analyzing the extent to which certain factors, meaningful and important from the economic and planning points of view, contributed to the inequality. As far as we know, none of the various known measures of inequality was used for this latter purpose.

Journal Article Technical Change and Capital from the Point of View of the Dual Get access R. E. Hall R. E. Hall Massachusetts Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 35, Issue 1, January 1968, Pages 35–46, https://doi.org/10.2307/2974405 Published: 01 January 1968

Peter A. Firmin, Seymour S. Goodman, Thomas E. Hendricks, James J. Linn, University Cost Structure and Behavior: An Empirical Study, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 6, Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies 1968 (1968), pp. 122-155