ABSTRACT We investigate the frictions that impede individual investors’ use of accounting information and, in particular, their costs of monitoring and acquiring accounting disclosures. We do so using an archival setting in which individuals are presented with automated media articles that report both current earnings news and past stock returns. Although these investors have earnings information readily available, we find no evidence that their trades incorporate it. Instead we find that their trading responds to the trailing stock returns presented in the articles. Our study raises questions about the efficacy of regulations that aim to aid less sophisticated investors by increasing their awareness of and access to accounting information.

This paper reviews the literature examining how costs of monitoring for, acquiring, and analyzing firm disclosures – collectively, “disclosure processing costs” – affect investor information choices, trades, and market outcomes. The existence of disclosure processing costs means that disclosures are not “public” information as traditionally defined, but instead can be a form of costly private information. Conceptualizing disclosures as private information makes it clear that learning from disclosures is an active economic choice and that disclosure pricing cannot be perfectly efficient. We review the analytical and empirical literature on sources of processing costs and how these costs affect equity market outcomes, primarily within rational equilibria. We also discuss studies of the feedback effects of investors' processing costs on managers’ choices about disclosure and corporate actions. We conclude that disclosure processing costs have implications for a wide array of accounting research and phenomena, but we are only just beginning to understand their effects.

ABSTRACT: How do firms repair their reputations after a serious accounting restatement? To answer this question, we review firms' press releases and identify 1,765 reputation-building actions taken by: (1) 94 restating firms in the periods before and after their restatement; and (2) a set of matched control firms during contemporaneous periods. We posit that firms have incentives to target multiple stakeholders in a reputation repair strategy—including capital providers, customers, employees, and geographic communities—and that actions targeting each group generate positive market returns as reputation capital is repaired. Consistent with our predictions, the frequency of, and stock returns to, reputation-building actions are greater for restating firms in the period after their restatement than for the control groups. In addition, firm characteristics predict the types of stakeholders targeted by firms. Finally, actions targeted at both capital providers and other stakeholders are associated with improvements in the restating firm's financial reporting credibility. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the sources indicated.

Using comprehensive data on U.S. corporate bond trades since 2002, we find evidence that retail bond investors overrely on untimely credit ratings to their financial detriment. Specifically, they appear to select bonds by first screening on a credit rating and then sorting by yield, buying the highest-yielding bonds within each rating level. Because yields lead credit rating changes, selecting on yield-within-rating means that retail investors systematically trade in the opposite direction of changing fundamentals, buy in advance of credit downgrades and defaults, and materially underperform a diversified portfolio. Our study provides new evidence of ill-informed retail trading in a market that is thought to be relatively sophisticated, corroborates regulators’ concerns about investor overreliance on credit ratings, and contributes to the academic literature on the roles and consequences of credit ratings in debt markets.

ABSTRACT Generative artificial intelligence (GAI) will likely alter many aspects of the financial reporting process and spawn a deep stream of academic research. We take an early step by examining the extent to which firms have begun using GAI in one important part of the reporting process: writing disclosures. We begin by evaluating a commercial tool's ability to detect GAI writing in disclosures, and we find that it reliably identifies even very small amounts of GAI usage in realistic samples. We then examine firms’ actual earnings press releases, conference call prepared remarks, risk factors, MD&As, and IPO filings through 2024 and find statistically significant GAI usage in all five disclosure types, with up to 4.5% of new text written by GAI in 2024. Usage is predictably higher in the cross‐section, and filings with higher GAI have systematically different linguistic properties. Our study provides early insights into the use and effects of GAI in financial reporting, and it motivates future research in this evolving area.

We investigate the consequences of the “revolving door” for trial lawyers at the SEC’s enforcement division. If future job opportunities motivate SEC lawyers to develop and/or showcase their enforcement expertise, then the revolving door phenomenon will promote more aggressive regulatory activity (the “human capital” hypothesis). In contrast, SEC lawyers can relax enforcement efforts in order to develop networking skills and/or curry favor with prospective employers at private law firms (the “rent seeking” hypothesis”). We collect data on the career paths of 336 SEC lawyers that span 284 SEC civil cases against accounting misrepresentation over the period 1990–2007. Our overall evidence is consistent with the “human capital” hypothesis. However, we find some evidence of “rent seeking” when SEC lawyers are based in Washington DC and when defense firms employ more former SEC lawyers. The revolving door likely impacts numerous aspects of SEC regulation setting and enforcement. This study examines accounting-related civil cases and is not able to study administrative or non-accounting enforcement cases. Further, the study does not address the choice of which cases to pursue, the incentives of employees other than trial lawyers, or how the revolving door affects rule making. Subject to these caveats, our study provides an important first look into the effects of revolving door incentives on the SEC’s enforcement process and lays the groundwork for future research.

Mutual funds hold 32% of the U.S. equity market and comprise 58% of retirement savings, yet retail investors consistently make poor choices when selecting funds. Theory suggests poor choices are partially due to fund managers creating unnecessarily complex disclosures and fee structures to keep investors uninformed and obfuscate poor performance. An empirical challenge in investigating this “strategic obfuscation” theory is isolating manipulated complexity from complexity arising from inherent differences across funds. We examine obfuscation among S&P 500 index funds, which have largely the same regulations, risks, and gross returns but charge widely different fees. Using bespoke measures of complexity designed for mutual funds, we find evidence consistent with funds attempting to obfuscate high fees. This study improves our understanding of why investors make poor mutual fund choices and how price dispersion persists among homogeneous index funds. We also discuss insights for mutual fund regulation and academic literature on corporate disclosures.

ABSTRACT Local-thinking bias, wherein agents overweight information that comes readily to mind, is a prominent finding in cognitive psychology. In this study, we investigate local-thinking bias in the context of sell-side analysts and measure each analyst’s “local” information as news stemming from their individual coverage portfolio. Tests examining multiple analysts forecasting on the same focal firm at the same time find that individual analysts overweight idiosyncratic local news and underweight news from economically linked firms that are not in their coverage portfolios. Market prices track the analyst bias from local news, leading to predictable and economically significant return reversal patterns in the future. A trading strategy that adjusts for analysts’ biases earns meaningful abnormal returns. We discuss the implications of these findings for three literatures: (1) cognitive psychology, (2) analyst behavior, and (3) behavioral asset pricing. JEL Classifications: D91; G14; G17; G41; M41; M49.