ABSTRACT This paper describes an empirical study of over 4000 specific share return forecasts made by 35 UK stockbrokers and by the internal analysts of a large UK investment institution. A comparison of forecast and realised returns reveals a small but potentially useful degree of forecasting ability. A large part of the information content of the forecasts, however, appears to be discounted in the market place within the first month. Nevertheless, an analysis of some 3000 transactions motivated by, and executed at the time of, the forecasts shows that the apparent predictive ability of the recommendations could be translated into superior performance by the fund's investment managers. Differences in forecasting ability between brokers do not appear to persist over time, but predictive accuracy can be improved by pooling simultaneous forecasts from different sources.

This paper examines the problems of estimating risk measures and their stability in thin markets. It shows analytically that conventional approaches used in previous studies can lead to serious overestimates of the stability of risk measures when shares are subject to thin trading. It then demonstrates, using UK data, that this is, in fact, a serious practical problem, and that the resultant biases are of precisely the form predicted. Finally, the paper presents reliable evidence on the stability of UK risk measures by using an estimation method designed to avoid thin trading bias. Using this approach, risk measures are found to be as stable in the UK as they are in the USA.

This paper uses stamp catalogue prices to investigate the returns on British collectible postage stamps over the period 1900–2008. We find an annualized return on stamps of 7.0% in nominal terms, or 2.9% in real terms. These returns are higher than those on bonds but below those on equities. The volatility of stamp prices approaches that of equities. Stamp returns are impacted by movements in the equity market, but the systematic risk of stamps remains low. Stamps partially hedge against unanticipated inflation. Estimates of average after-cost returns for individual investors show that stamps may rival equities in terms of realized performance.

Abstract The risk-return characteristics of art as an asset have been previously studied through aggregate price indexes. By contrast, we examine the long-run buy-and-hold performance of an actual portfolio, namely, the collection of John Maynard Keynes. We find that its performance has substantially exceeded existing estimates of art market returns. Our analysis of the collection identifies general attributes of art portfolios crucial in explaining why investor returns can substantially diverge from market returns: transaction-specific risk, buyer heterogeneity, return skewness, and portfolio concentration. Furthermore, our findings highlight the limitations of art price indexes as a guide to asset allocation or performance benchmarking. (JEL B26, C43, G11, G12, G14, Z11) Received: September 7, 2018: Editorial decision: November 24, 2019 by Editor: Nikolai Roussanov

Abstract The consensus view of the influential economist John Maynard Keynes is that he was a stellar investor. We provide an extensive quantitative appraisal of his performance over a quarter century and present detailed analysis of his archived trading records. His top-down approach initially generated disappointing returns with no evidence of any market-timing ability. However, from the early 1930s his performance improved as he evolved into a bottom-up stock picker with substantial active risk and pronounced size and value tilts. Our reconstruction of Keynes’s stock trading provides a unique record of realized performance and sheds light on how equity investing developed historically.

ABSTRACT A central measure of the efficiency of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market is the extent to which issues are underpriced. We present new and comprehensive evidence covering British IPOs since World War I. During the period from 1917 to 1945, public offers were underpriced by an average of only 3.80%, as compared to 9.15% in the period from 1946 to 1986, and even more after the U.K. stock market was deregulated in 1986. The post‐WWII rise in underpricing cannot be attributed to changes in firm composition, and occurred in spite of improvements in regulation, disclosure, and the prestige of IPO underwriters.

Using historical price records for Bordeaux Premiers Crus, we examine the impact of aging on wine prices and the long-term investment performance of fine wine. In line with the predictions of an illustrative model, young maturing wines from high-quality vintages provide the highest financial returns. Past maturity, famous châteaus deliver growing non-pecuniary benefits to their owners. Using an arithmetic repeat-sales regression over 1900–2012, we estimate a real financial return to wine investment (net of storage costs) of 4.1%, which exceeds bonds, art, and stamps. Returns to wine and equities are positively correlated. Finally, we find evidence of in-sample return predictability.