Many classes of assets are illiquid or nonmarketable in that they cannot always be traded immediately. Thus, a portfolio position in these becomes at least temporarily irreversible. We study the asset-pricing implications of this type of illiquidity in an exchange economy with heterogeneous agents. In this market, one asset is always liquid. The other asset can be traded initially, but then not again until after a “blackout” period. Illiquidity has a dramatic effect. Agents abandon diversification and choose polarized portfolios instead. The value of liquidity can represent a large portion of the equilibrium price of an asset. (JEL G11, G12)

ABSTRACT We study the marginal tax rate incorporated into short‐term municipal rates using municipal swap market data. Using an affine model, we identify the marginal tax rate and the credit/liquidity spread in 1‐week tax‐exempt rates, as well as their associated risk premia. The marginal tax rate averages 38.0% and is related to stock, bond, and commodity returns. The tax risk premium is negative, consistent with the strong countercyclical nature of after‐tax fixed‐income cash flows. These results demonstrate that tax risk is a systematic asset pricing factor and help resolve the muni‐bond puzzle.

This paper shows that all traditional forms of the expectations hypothesis can be consistent with the absence of arbitrage if markets are incomplete. A key implication is that the validity of the expectations hypothesis is purely an empirical issue; the expectations hypothesis cannot be ruled out on a priori theoretical grounds.

ABSTRACT How marketability affects security prices is one of the most important issues in finance. We derive a simple analytical upper bound on the value of marketability using option‐pricing theory. We show that discounts for lack of marketability can potentially be large even when the illiquidity period is very short. This analysis also provides a benchmark for assessing the potential costs of exchange rules and regulatory requirements restricting the ability of investors to trade when desired. Furthermore, these results provide new insights into the relation between discounts for lack of marketability and the length of the marketability restriction.

How marketability affects security prices is one of the most important issues in finance. We derive a simple analytical upper bound on the value of marketability using option-pricing theory. We show that discounts for lack of marketability can potentially be large even when the illiquidity period is very short. This analysis also provides a benchmark for assessing the potential costs of exchange rules and regulatory requirements restricting the ability of investors to trade when desired. Furthermore, these results provide new insights into the relation between discounts for lack of marketability and the length of the marketability restriction.

How marketability affects security prices is one of the most important issues in finance. The authors derive a simple analytical upper bound on the value of marketability using option-pricing theory. They show that discounts for lack of marketability can potentially be large even when the illiquidity period is very short. This analysis also provides a benchmark for assessing the potential costs of exchange rules and regulatory requirements restricting the ability of investors to trade when desired. Furthermore, these results provide new insights into the relation between discounts for lack of marketability and the length of the marketability restriction.

ABSTRACT Empirical evidence of time varying term premia in bond returns is frequently interpreted as evidence against the Expectations Hypothesis. This paper shows that the Expectations Hypothesis can actually imply time varying term premia if the time frame for which the Expectations Hypothesis holds differs from the return measurement period. Furthermore, many of the properties of these term premia are consistent with those of observed term premia. These results are important because they imply that the case against the Expectations Hypothesis is weaker than claimed in the empirical literature.

Empirical evidence of time varying term premia in bond returns is frequently interpreted as evidence against the Expectations Hypothesis. This paper shows that the Expectations Hypothesis can actually imply time varying term premia if the time frame for which the Expectations Hypothesis holds differs from the return measurement period. Furthermore, many of the properties of these term premia are consistent with those of observed term premia. These results are important because they imply that the case against the Expectations Hypothesis is weaker than claimed in the empirical literature.

Empirical evidence of time varying term premia in bond returns is frequently interpreted as evidence against the expectations hypothesis. This paper shows that the expectations hypothesis can actually imply time varying term premia if the time frame for which the expectations hypothesis holds differs from the return measurement period. Furthermore, many of the properties of these term premia are consistent with those of observed term premia. These results are important because they imply that the case against the expectations hypothesis is weaker than claimed in the empirical literature.

Many common types of financial contracts incorporate options with extendible maturities. This paper derives closed-form expressions for options that can be extended by the optionholder and presents a number of applications including the valuation of American options with stochastic dividends, junk bonds, and shared-equity mortgages. We also derive closed-form expressions for writer-extendible options and discuss the writer's economic incentives for extending an out-of-the-money option. We apply these results to show that corporate debtholders have a strong incentive to extend the maturity of defaulting debt if there are liquidation costs. We model and solve the debtholders' optimal extension problem and show that the possibility of an extension can induce shareholders in highly levered firms to accept negative NPV projects.