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The Design of Reform Packages Under Uncertainty

American Economic Review 1993
The authors present a model of large-scale economic reforms, modeled on the transition process in Eastern Europe, with aggregate and individual uncertainty concerning the outcome of reforms. The government is assumed to choose the speed and sequencing of reforms. The authors compare big-bang strategies with gradualist reform packages. They show that gradualist reform packages may be easier to get started, optimal sequencing of reforms should aim at creating constituencies for further reforms, and gradualism may generate a higher investment response because of a lower option value of waiting than would a big-bang approach.

The Design of Corporate Debt Structure and Bankruptcy

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(7), 2648-2679
This article integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an optimal contracting framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm’s debt capacity while increasing its incentives to default strategically. The optimal debt contract gives creditors claims that are jointly inconsistent in case of default. Bankruptcy rules are therefore a necessary part of the overall financing contract, to make claims consistent and to prevent a value-reducing run for the assets of the firm. We characterize these rules, with predictions about the allocation of security rights, the right to trigger bankruptcy, and the symmetry of treatment of creditors in default.

Comparative Politics and Public Finance

Journal of Political Economy 2000 108(6), 1121-1161 open access
We propose a model with micropolitical foundations to compare the public …nance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. Compared to a parliamentary system, a presidentialcongressional system has less incentives for legislative cohesion, but has a clearer separation of powers. These features make public …nance outcomes radically di¤erent in the two systems. A Parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more rents to politicians and a higher tax burden, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards powerful minorities, more underprovision of public goods, but less rents to politicians and a smaller size of government. JEL classi…cation: H00, D72, D78.

Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual‐Track Approach to Transition

Journal of Political Economy 2000 108(1), 120-143
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the dual‐track approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient Pareto‐improving economic reform, that is, reform achieving efficiency without creating losers. The approach, based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market, can be understood as a method for making implicit lump‐sum transfers to compensate potential losers of the reform. The model highlights the critical roles of enforcement of the plan for achieving Pareto improvement and full liberalization of the market track for achieving efficiency. We examine how the dual‐track approach has worked in product and labor market liberalization in China.

Who Are China's Entrepreneurs?

American Economic Review 2006 96(2), 348-352
It has been increasingly recognized that entrepreneurship plays a crucial role in successful economies. The Schumpeterian approach to growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1997) advances the view that entrepreneurial dynamism is the key to innovation and growth. A growing body of policy work emphasizes the important role of entrepreneurs in economic development (World Bank, 2003). Yet, research on entrepreneurship in economics is rather limited. There are three distinct perspectives on entrepreneurship in social sciences. The first perspective focuses on the role of economic, political, and legal institutions in fostering or restricting entrepreneurship. Institutional problems are seen in credit constraints that make it impossible to borrow and set up businesses; insecurity of property rights that provides insufficient incentives for entrepreneurs; and regulatory burdens that make setting up new enterprises difficult. The second perspective focuses on the sociological variables shaping entrepreneurship. For example, sociologists study the role of values and social networks in promoting or discouraging entrepreneurial activities. Social networks may work through a variety of channels, such as family, friends, or ethnic groups. The third perspective emphasizes individual characteristics of entrepreneurs. Psychologists have studied the traits associated with entrepreneurship such as a personal need for achievement, belief in the effect of personal effort on outcomes, attitudes towards risk, and individual self-confidence. Although there are studies on each perspective, little work looks at each of these factors taking the other into account. This is precisely what we do in this paper, using a new data set of Chinese entrepreneurs and a matching sample of non-entrepreneurs with similar age, gender, and educational characteristics. The survey covers both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in order to understand how they differ in individual characteristics, family background, social networks, values and beliefs, and perceptions of the institutional environment. The data further allow us to separate Chinese entrepreneurs into two groups, by necessity and by opportunity, and to differentiate non-entrepreneurs in three groups, those who never thought to be entrepreneurs, those who thought but never became entrepreneurs, and those who became entrepreneurs but eventually failed. This is a richer data set than a previous survey in Russia.