We use price pressure resulting from purchases by mutual funds with large capital inflows to identify overvalued equity. This is a relatively exogenous overvaluation indicator as it is associated with who is buying—buyers with excess liquidity—rather than what is being purchased. We document substantial stock price impact associated with purchases by high‐inflow mutual funds, and find the probability of a seasoned equity offering (SEO), insider sales, and the probability of a stock‐based acquisition increase significantly in the four quarters following the mutual fund buying pressure. These results provide new evidence that firm managers are able to identify and exploit overvalued equity.

We examine how cross-country differences in product, capital, and labor market competition, as well as earnings management affect mean reversion in accounting return on assets. Using a sample of 48,465 unique firms from 49 countries, we find that accounting returns mean revert faster in countries where there is more product and capital market competition, as predicted by economic theory. Country differences in labor market competition and earnings management are also related to mean reversion in accounting returns—but the relation varies with firm performance. Country labor competition increases mean reversion when unexpected returns are positive but slows it when unexpected returns are negative. Accounting returns in countries with higher earnings management mean revert more slowly for profitable firms and more rapidly for loss firms. Thus earnings management incentives to slow or speed up mean reversion in accounting returns are accentuated in countries where there is a high propensity for earnings management. Overall, these findings suggest that country factors explain mean reversion in accounting returns and are therefore relevant for firm valuation.

Despite the rising use of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings, there is substantial disagreement across rating agencies regarding what rating to give to individual firms. As what drives this disagreement is unclear, we examine whether a firm's ESG disclosure helps explain some of this disagreement. We predict and find that greater ESG disclosure actually leads to greater ESG rating disagreement. These findings hold using firm fixed effects and using a difference-in-differences design with mandatory ESG disclosure shocks. We also find that raters disagree more about ESG outcome metrics than input metrics (policies), and that disclosure appears to amplify disagreement more for outcomes. Last, we examine consequences of ESG disagreement and find that greater ESG disagreement is associated with higher return volatility, larger absolute price movements, and a lower likelihood of issuing external financing. Overall, our findings highlight that ESG disclosure generally exacerbates ESG rating disagreement rather than resolves it. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

Targets are an integral component of management control systems and play a significant role in achieving desirable performance outcomes. We focus on a key environmental performance objective—reduction of carbon emissions—as a setting in which to examine how target difficulty affects the degree of target completion in long-term non-financial performance. We use a novel dataset compiled by the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and find that firms setting more difficult targets complete a higher percentage of such targets. We also find that this effect is negatively moderated by the provision of monetary incentives. We corroborate this evidence by showing that target difficulty is more effective for carbon reduction projects requiring more novel knowledge and in high-pollution industries. We discuss limitations and suggest avenues for future research.

We explore the contract design of sustainability-linked loans (SLLs), a rapidly growing form of ESG-labeled debt that ties loan pricing to firms’ sustainability performance. Using a global SLL sample issued between 2017 and 2023, we examine whether SLLs are structured to discipline borrowers with weak ESG performance through stringent sustainability-linked provisions. We find no association between borrower ESG performance and the rigor of SLL provisions, suggesting that SLLs are generally not designed as incentive contracts. Instead, SLL contract design aligns more closely with ESG branding and credit-product-expansion motives: borrowers leverage SLLs to enhance legitimacy and visibility and to attract additional capital, whereas lenders can convey their ESG commitment, cater to investor demand for ESG-labeled debt, and expand their credit product offering. Overall, our evidence suggests that SLLs function primarily as symbolic labels rather than credible mechanisms for driving meaningful improvements in firms’ sustainability outcomes. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text.