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Expropriation Dynamics

American Economic Review 2009 99(2), 473-479 open access
Many emerging market economies oscillate between periods of high and low growth (see Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). These changes in growth regimes generate business cycles that are markedly different from the ones observed in developed countries: consumption and investment are volatile relative to output, and net exports are strongly counter-cyclical. This volatility is often accompanied by sharp changes in the policy environment as well. For example, figure 1 shows the relationship between two measures of expropriation and political risk and real GDP for Argentina between 1984 and 2007. For easy comparison to the GDP series, the risk factors are inverted so that an increase in the index corresponds to a decrease in risk, and all series are normalized to 100 in 1984.1 The risk factor series are highly correlated with output.2 When GDP is higher than average, the institutions and government policies in Argentina foster growth, as measured by increased political stability, enhanced respect for property rights, and stronger contract enforcement. In Aguiar et al. (forthcoming), we develop a framework to understand these policy reversals and the associated economic volatility. In particular, we explore the joint dynamics of sovereign debt, investment, and expropriation risk in a small open economy model. Our departing point from previous work was the introduction of two political economy frictions. ∗Prepared for the January 2009 AEA Annual Meeting. We thank Thomas Sampson for excellent research assistance. 1The measures of risk are taken from Political Risk Services (PRS). The Expropriation Risk Index is a scaled version of the PRS Investment Profile series, which summarizes the government’s attitude toward inward investment based on four risk factors: expropriation, taxation, repatriation, and labor costs. The Political Risk index assigns risk points to a group of factors, of which, the Investment Profile variable is one. Real GDP is from the World Development Indicators. 2The correlation between the inverse measure of expropriation risk and GDP is 0.68, and the political risk and GDP is 0.71.

Integrated Monetary and Financial Policies for Small Open Economies

Econometrica 2025 93(6), 2201-2234
We develop a tractable small‐open‐economy framework to characterize the constrained efficient use of the monetary policy rate, foreign exchange (FX) intervention, capital controls, and domestic macroprudential measures. The model features dominant currency pricing, positive premia on local currency debt arising from financiers' portfolio constraints, and occasionally‐binding external and domestic borrowing constraints. We characterize the conditions under which the traditional prescription—relying solely on the policy rate and exchange rate flexibility—remains sufficient, even in the presence of externalities. By contrast, to manage noise trader flows into and out of the local currency debt market, FX intervention and in some cases capital inflow taxes should be used instead of the traditional prescription. Moreover, if a country faces a mix of local currency premia and external borrowing constraints, we establish that certain regulations to limit FX mismatch may alleviate the external borrowing constraint but exacerbate the local currency premia. Finally, we show that capital controls may dominate domestic macroprudential measures in cases when external shocks trigger stress in domestic housing markets.

Sovereign Debt Booms in Monetary Unions

American Economic Review 2014 104(5), 101-106
We propose a continuous time model to investigate the impact of inflation credibility on sovereign debt dynamics. At every point in time, an impatient government decides fiscal surplus and inflation, without commitment. Inflation is costly, but reduces the real value of outstanding nominal debt. In equilibrium, debt dynamics is the result of two opposing forces: (i) impatience and (ii) the desire to conquer low inflation. A large increase in inflation credibility can trigger a process of debt accumulation. This rationalizes the sovereign debt booms that are often experienced by low inflation credibility countries upon joining a currency union.

Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2015 130(4), 1727-1779 open access
We study fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union with the potential for rollover crises in sovereign debt markets. Member-country fiscal authorities lack commitment to repay their debt and choose fiscal policy independently. A common monetary authority chooses inflation for the union, also without commitment. We first describe the existence of a fiscal externality that arises in the presence of limited commitment and leads countries to overborrow; this externality rationalizes the imposition of debt ceilings in a monetary union. We then investigate the impact of the composition of debt in a monetary union, that is the fraction of high-debt versus low-debt members, on the occurrence of self-fulfilling debt crises. We demonstrate that a high-debt country may be less vulnerable to crises and have higher welfare when it belongs to a union with an intermediate mix of high- and low-debt members, than one where all other members are low-debt. This contrasts with the conventional wisdom that all countries should prefer a union with low-debt members, as such a union can credibly deliver low inflation. These findings shed new light on the criteria for an optimal currency area in the presence of rollover crises.

International Prices, Costs, and Markup Differences

American Economic Review 2011 101(6), 2450-2486 open access
Relative cross-border retail prices, in a common currency, comove closely with the nominal exchange rate. Using product-level prices and wholesale costs from a grocery chain operating in the United States and Canada, we decompose this variation into relative costs and markup components. The high correlation of nominal and real exchange rates is driven mainly by changes in relative costs. National borders segment markets. Retail prices respond to changes in costs in neighboring stores within the same country but not across the border. Prices have a median discontinuous change of 24 percent at the border and 0 percent at state boundaries.

Dominant Currency Paradigm

American Economic Review 2020 110(3), 677-719 open access
We propose a “dominant currency paradigm” with three key features: dominant currency pricing, pricing complementarities, and imported inputs in production. We test this paradigm using a new dataset of bilateral price and volume indices for more than 2,500 country pairs that covers 91 percent of world trade, as well as detailed firm-product-country data for Colombian exports and imports. In strong support of the paradigm we find that (i) noncommodities terms-of-trade are uncorrelated with exchange rates; (ii) the dollar exchange rate quantitatively dominates the bilateral exchange rate in price pass-through and trade elasticity regressions, and this effect is increasing in the share of imports invoiced in dollars; (iii) US import volumes are significantly less sensitive to bilateral exchange rates, compared to other countries’ imports; (iv) a 1 percent US dollar appreciation against all other currencies predicts a 0.6 percent decline within a year in the volume of total trade between countries in the rest of the world, controlling for the global business cycle. We characterize the transmission of, and spillovers from, monetary policy shocks in this environment.