Jonathan S. H. Kornbluth, Joseph D. Vinso, Capital Structure and the Financing of the Multinational Corporation: A Fractional Multiobjective Approach, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Jun., 1982), pp. 147-178

The allegations and conclusions of the Metcalf report (U.S. Senate [1977]) motivated attempts to explain or refute the notion that the setting of financial accounting standards is controlled by special interest groups (Haring [1979], Hussein and Ketz [1980], Patton [1980], and Newman [1981a; 1981b]). Given the assumptions of the voting model tested in each case, the results suggest no apparent control of the Financial Accounting Standards Board by the so-called accounting establishmentBig public accounting firms and their clients. Each of these studies examined the past voting behavior of accounting policy bodies and tested hypotheses regarding certain sorts of coalition formation, primarily coalitions of public accountants from Big Eight firms. Even though there was no evidence of control by the Big Eight, Newman [1981a] argued that the Big Eight still had the potential to control the FASB. His argument was supported by a priori calculations of real voting power indices of a possible bloc of FASB representatives drawn from these largest public accounting firms. Newman's calculations rest on three forms of critical assumptions underlying the application of a priori real voting power indices to actual voting situations. These assumptions affect the outcomes and the relevance of voting power indices for such analyses. The objectives of this

William H. Beaver, Mark A. Wolfson, Foreign Currency Translation and Changing Prices in Perfect and Complete Markets, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 20, No. 2, Part II (Autumn, 1982), pp. 528-550

Women began to enter nontraditional occupations at an increasing rate at the same time federal equal opportunity policy was strengthened. In 1972, equal employment opportunity (EEO) policy was strengthened and expanded, and equal opportunity in education became federal policy for the first time. These policies constitute a two-pronged attack on sex discrimination because they address impediments to mobility on both the demand and supply sides of the labor market. Together, they should increase women's access to nontraditional jobs and to the skills necessary to perform them. During the 1970's, women made occupational gains that are concentrated disproportionately in the white-collar occupations. One explanation for this is that the impact of federal equal opportunity policy differs across schooling levels. In Section I, I discuss federal equal opportunity policy. Section II contains empirical evidence on the direct effects of EEO policy on sex differentials in earnings and occupational segregation by sex. Section III presents estimates of changes in the effect of schooling on women's entry into nontraditional occupations during the 1970's, and attempts to determine what portion may be due to equal educational opportunity policy and to indirect effects of EEO policy.

Treble correct when he states that the integral representing consumer surplus is increasing in D(, where Do stands for market radius for the firm. But he incorrect in his speculation that the CV solution under L6schian competition according/v yields an increasingly smaller consumer surplus in the aggregate. Note that the decreasing surplus with decreasing Do created by each one of the individual firms which are increasing in number under free entrv. The aggregate consumer surplus therefore not necessarily greater under spatial monopoly than it under conditions of spatial competition. In fact, it can readily be shown to be increased, not decreased, with an increasing entry under the CV model. To prove our contention consider the average consumer surplus a la W. Holahan [3] which given below by evaluating Treble's integral S in [4, p. 1328] and in turn dividing both sides of the resulting equation by Do:

This paper establishes a natural and satisfying characterization of the class of collective choice rules which are acyclic and satisfy the Arrow axioms (unrestricted domain, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the weak Pareto principle). We show that, when the number of alternatives is larger than the number of individuals, there must exist an individual who can at least some critical number of pairwise decisions. This critical number of veto pairs depends on the number of alternatives and individuals, and, as the number of alternatives increases without limit, the fraction of all pairs which some individual can veto approaches unity. We also present a global veto theorem and an axiomatic characterization of the Pareto extension rule which utilizes acyclicity rather than quasi-transitivity. ARROW [1] SHOWED that the only collective choice rules that yield weak order social preference relations and satisfy unrestricted domain, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the weak Pareto principle are dictatorial. Gibbard [9] demonstrated that by relaxing the rationality requirement from transitivity to quasi-transitivity (i.e., transitivity of the strict preference relation) we can evade the letter though not the spirit of the Arrow dictatorship result: oligarchy, a weaker form of dictatorship, still obtains when the other three axioms are imposed. In this paper we prove a theorem parallel to those of Arrow and Gibbard for the weaker rationality requirement of acyclicity (i.e., the absence of cycles of strict preference). Since acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a nonempty set of maximal elements in every finite feasible set, there are powerful reasons for imposing it. Moreover, as we argue in Blair and Pollak [2], it is difficult to justify any stronger rationality property such as quasi-transitivity without at the same time justifying some even stronger rationality condition which implies dictatorship. Our principal result shows that, when the number of alternatives is larger than the number of individuals, there must exist an individual who can at least some critical number of pairwise decisions. (We say that individual i has a veto over the ordered pair (y, x) if he is weakly decisive for x against y-that is, if his strict preference for x over y implies weak social preference for x over y, regardless of the preferences of other individuals.) This critical number of veto pairs depends on the number of alternatives and the number of individuals. As the number of alternatives increases without limit, the fraction of all pairs that some individual can veto approaches unity. There may be more than one individual who can veto at least the critical number of pairs; indeed, it is possible for every individual to have a veto over every ordered pair of alternatives.