This paper examines the relationship between the profitability of small single-market banks and the presence in the market of large banking organizations and banking organizations that operate primarily outside of the local banking market. We find that, in rural banking markets, the profitability of small single-market banks is significantly related to the presence of both large and small primarily-out-of-market banks. We also find that an increased presence of large or small primarily-out-of-market banks in rural banking markets reduces the positive effect of an increase in concentration on small single-market bank profits. This finding is consistent with theoretical predictions reported in the recent literature and has important implications for antitrust policy. In urban banking markets, we find little evidence of any relationship between the profitability of small single-market banks and the presence of large or primarily-out-of-market banks.

[Existing research shows that significantly more acquisitions occur when stock markets are booming than when markets are depressed. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) hypothesize that firm-specific and market-wide (mis-)valuations lead to an excess of mergers, and these will be value destroying. This article investigates whether acquisitions occurring during booming markets are fundamentally different from those occurring during depressed markets. We find that acquirers buying during high-valuation markets have significantly higher announcement returns but lower long-run abnormal stock and operating performance than those buying during low-valuation markets. We investigate possible explanations for the long-run underperformance and conclude it is consistent with managerial herding.]

February 01 2009 Estimating the Variance of Wages in the Presence of Selection and Unobserved Heterogeneity Stacey H Chen Stacey H Chen Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Stacey H Chen Online ISSN: 1530-9142 Print ISSN: 0034-6535 Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2009 The Review of Economics and Statistics (2009) 91 (1): 227. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.91.1.227 Connected Content This is a correction to: Estimating the Variance of Wages in the Presence of Selection and Unobserved Heterogeneity Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Stacey H Chen; Estimating the Variance of Wages in the Presence of Selection and Unobserved Heterogeneity. The Review of Economics and Statistics 2009; 91 (1): 227. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.91.1.227 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsThe Review of Economics and Statistics Search Advanced Search View Original Article Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2009 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

We analyze the effects of differences of opinion on the dynamics of trading volume in stocks and options. We find that disagreements about the mean of the current- and next-period public information lead to trading in stocks in the current period but have no effect on options trading. Without options, we find that disagreements about the precision of all past and current public information affect trading in stocks in the current period. With options, only disagreements about the precisions of the next- and current-period information affect stocks and options trading in the current period. Our results suggest that options trading is concentrated around information events that are likely to cause disagreements among investors, whereas trading in stocks may be diffusive over many periods.

Existing research shows that significantly more acquisitions occur when stock markets are booming than when markets are depressed. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) hypothesize that firm-specific and market-wide valuations lead to an excess of mergers, and these will be value destroying. This article investigates whether acquisitions occurring during booming markets are fundamentally different from those occurring during depressed markets. We find that acquirers buying during high-valuation markets have significantly higher announcement returns but lower long-run abnormal stock and operating performance than those buying during low-valuation markets. We investigate possible explanations for the long-run underperformance and conclude it is consistent with managerial herding. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Many directors are not simply insiders or outsiders. For example, an officer of a supplier is neither independent nor captive of management. We use a spatial model of board decision-making to analyze bargaining among multiple types of directors. Board decisions are modeled using a new solution concept called consensus. We use consensus to show that the information a new director brings is more important than the new director's impact on bargaining when the board is large and not too diverse. Our model suggests broadening the regulatory definition of independence and requiring a supermajority of outsiders. It also cautions that strong penalties, such as those imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley erode incentives when board performance is difficult to measure.

We develop and empirically test a parsimonious model of how specific knowledge and the value of knowledge sharing influence manufacturing plants' incentive design choices. Our results confirm the prediction that increases in the extent of agents' specific knowledge and the value of knowledge sharing are associated with greater (less) reliance on output (input) performance measures. Moreover, consistent with our model's prediction, we find that plants rely more on group-based (as opposed to individual-based) output performance measures when the value of knowledge sharing is higher, or the extent of agents' specific knowledge is lower. Finally, consistent with previous research, we find that as output performance measures become noisier, firms rely less on these measures in incentive contracts.

This paper studies international equity markets when some investors have private information that is valuable for trading in many countries simultaneously. We use a dynamic model of equity trading to show that global private information helps explain US investors’ trading behavior and performance. In particular, the model predicts global return chasing (positive co-movement of US investors’ net purchases with returns in many countries) which we show to be present in the data. Return chasing in our model can be due to superior performance of US investors, not inferior knowledge or naive trend-following. We also show that trades due to private information are strongly correlated across countries. A common (global) factor accounts for about half their variation.

Most major American industrial business cycles from around 1880 to the First World War were caused by fluctuations in the size of the cotton harvest due to economically exogenous factors such as weather. Wheat and corn harvests did not affect industrial production; nor did the cotton harvest before the late 1870s. The unique effect of the cotton harvest in this period can be explained as an essentially monetary phenomenon, the result of interactions between harvests, international gold flows, and high-powered money demand under America's goldstandard regime of 1879–1914.