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Competition and Quality: Evidence from High-Speed Railways and Airlines

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2025 107(2), 494-509
Abstract The entry of High-Speed Railways (HSR) represents disruptive competition to airlines. Utilizing a unique dataset of all flights departing from Beijing to 113 domestic destinations in China since January 2009, we employ a difference-in-differences approach to examine the effects of HSR entry on on-time performance and to identify the channels. We document two main findings. First, the entry of HSR leads to significant reductions in the mean and variance of travel delays on the affected airline routes. Second, the reductions in departure delays and taxi-in times at the destination airports are identified as the main channels.

Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market

Journal of Political Economy 2008 116(2), 303-350
We provide evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap insurance market and analyze its sources. Conditional on controls for Medigap prices, those with Medigap spend, on average, $4,000 less on medical care than those without. But if we condition on health, those with Medigap spend $2,000 more. The sources of this advantageous selection include income, education, longevity expectations, and financial planning horizons, as well as cognitive ability. Conditional on all these factors, those with higher expected medical expenditures are more likely to purchase Medigap. Risk preferences do not appear as a source of advantageous selection; cognitive ability is particularly important. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

German Long-Term Health Insurance: Theory Meets Evidence

Journal of Political Economy 2025 133(6), 1840-1885
German long-term health insurance (GLTHI) represents the largest market for private long-term health insurance contracts in the world. We show that GLTHI’s contract design coincides with the optimal dynamic contract for individuals with constant lifetime income profiles. After estimating the key ingredients of a life-cycle model, we find that, under a variety of assumptions, GLTHI achieves welfare that is at most 4% lower than for the optimal contract. Relative to the gains of replacing short-term contracts with either of the two long-term contracts, this welfare gap is smallest when reclassification risk is high.