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Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition
This paper offers a new theory of destructive competition. The authors compare minimum resale price maintenance to retail market-clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers. In both the resale price maintenance and flexible-price games, retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty. The authors find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under resale price maintenance than under market-clearing. Surprisingly, consumer surplus can also be higher, in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called 'destructive.'
Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition
This paper offers a new theory of destructive competition. We compare minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) to retail market-clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers. In both the RPM and flexible-price games, retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty. We find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under RPM than under market-clearing. Surprisingly, consumer surplus can also be higher, in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called "destructive."
Concentration, Price, and Critical Concentration Ratios
A potentially important parameter that has not yet been convincingly estimated is the critical concentration ratio. This paper attempts to estimate it in three types of market. The estimation of a critical concentration ratio, if one exists, seems of potentially great importance because of its implication for antitrust policy. If a critical concentration ratio were found and if concentration had no effect below that level, it would seem to follow that a horizontal merger in a market where concentration was below the critical level and where the merger could not increase concentration to the critical level could not substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly.