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Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition

American Economic Review 1997
This paper offers a new theory of destructive competition. The authors compare minimum resale price maintenance to retail market-clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers. In both the resale price maintenance and flexible-price games, retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty. The authors find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under resale price maintenance than under market-clearing. Surprisingly, consumer surplus can also be higher, in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called 'destructive.'

Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition

American Economic Review 1997 87(4), 619-641
This paper offers a new theory of destructive competition. We compare minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) to retail market-clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers. In both the RPM and flexible-price games, retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty. We find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under RPM than under market-clearing. Surprisingly, consumer surplus can also be higher, in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called "destructive."

Concentration, Price, and Critical Concentration Ratios

The Review of Economics and Statistics 1981 63(3), 346
A potentially important parameter that has not yet been convincingly estimated is the critical concentration ratio. This paper attempts to estimate it in three types of market. The estimation of a critical concentration ratio, if one exists, seems of potentially great importance because of its implication for antitrust policy. If a critical concentration ratio were found and if concentration had no effect below that level, it would seem to follow that a horizontal merger in a market where concentration was below the critical level and where the merger could not increase concentration to the critical level could not substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly.