"This article uses the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Public Use Samples of the U.S. census to document what happened to immigrant earnings in the 1980s and to determine if pre-1980 immigrant flows reached earnings parity with natives. The relative entry wage of successive immigrant cohorts declined by 9% in the 1970s and by an additional 6% in the 1980s. Although the relative wage of immigrants grows by 10% during the first 2 decades after arrival, recent immigrants will earn 15%-20% less than natives throughout much of their working lives."

Using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data on tenure and wages, this article analyzes the extent to which the level of job mismatching varies over the business cycle and how it is dealt with by the labor market. I find significant cyclical variation in job match quality and an internalization of the variation by the labor market through wages. Mismatching occurs more during recessions but is primarily captured in starting wages. The evidence suggests the cyclical phenomenon is one of general mismatching rather than an increased number of stopgap jobs during recessions.

Executive stock options differ from exchange-traded options because of vesting and portability restrictions. Executive departure from the firm forces early exercise, reducing the value of executive options. Current methodology calculates the option value by multiplying the Black-Scholes option price by the departure probability. This ignores the possibility that executive departure is less likely when stock price is high, and thus is correlated with the stock price. We show that this correlation implies a substantial increase in option values. A similar situation occurs in performance-based option packages, where the actual number of options granted depends on stock performance.

We show that lowering the cost of acquisition of information that a principal obtains about the performance of an agent may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats. Hence it will weaken incentives and can therefore be counterproductive. This phenomenon is explored in a framework where improving the quality of information makes a commitment not to renegotiate less credible. Applications to the theory of the firm are briefly explored.

Many young men commit crime, and many are arrested. I estimate the effect of arrests on the employment and earnings of arrestees, using a large longitudinal data set constructed by merging police records with UI earnings data. I find that the effects of arrests are moderate in magnitude and rather short-lived. I.

The "efficiency wage hypothesis" offers an explanation for employment rents. According to this hypothesis, firms pay wages above the opportunity cost of labor to elicit productivity or quality-enhancing behaviors from employees. Firms pursue this strategy when alternative incentive schemes are unavailable or too costly. Thus, firms will not pay premium wages when employees post sufficiently large performance bonds. This article examines employment rents in a setting where employees post sizable performance bonds-large law firms. Contrary to the efficiency wage hypothesis, we find that associates in these large firms post substantial performance bonds while also receiving substantial, ex ante rents.

Professional team sports leagues provide insight into the problems facing the management of functioning cartels. This paper provides an analysis of the incentives and outcomes inherent in the management of professional team sports cartels. Except for revenue sharing and salary caps, league cartel management outcomes are consistent with league-wide revenue maximization and have no impact on competitive balance. However, there are predictable impacts on the profitability of strong- and weak-drawing teams within the league. While providing an analytical review of the literature, the work here also yields new results concerning salary caps, local TV revenue sharing, and the behavior of cartel managers in the face of rival leagues.