Prior studies have reported a positive correlation between insider trading and stock price changes implying that insider (i.e., informed) trades affect price discovery differently than non-insider (i.e., uninformed) trades. Based on these results, various scholars have argued for the legalization of insider trading to facilitate rapid price discovery. We analyze the trading activity of a confessed inside trader, Ivan Boesky, in Carnation's stock just prior to Nestle's 1984 acquisition of Carnation, and find that our tests are unable to distinguish the price effect of Boesky's (i.e., informed) purchases of Carnation's stock from the effect of non-insider (i.e., uninformed) purchases. Our conclusion survives extensive robustness tests and has methodological and public policy implications.

This paper is an in-depth investigation of 61 publicly-traded firms that chose to liquidate voluntarily on a piecemeal basis during the 1970s and 1980s. In comparison with their industry peers, these firms have lower Tobin's Q, a higher percentage of equity ownership by management and the board, a higher incidence of a member of the corporation's founding family in a key executive position or on the board, and a higher incidence of asset sales and prior attempts to transfer control of the firm. The average excess stock return of 20% around liquidation announcements is positively correlated with the fraction of stock owned by management and the board. These results suggest that firms that make the value enhancing decision to voluntarily liquidate confront low future growth opportunities, but the absence of future growth opportunities is not sufficient to bring about this decision. It is also necessary that decision makers have a vested interest in the outcome, either because of their ownership stake or because of their family affiliation with the business, and that the valuation consequences of the decision are greater, the more closely aligned are managerial and shareholder interests.

The market for auction rate securities (ARS) made headlines during the second week of February 2008 when auctions at which the bonds’ interest rates reset experienced a wave of “failures.” Contrary to headlines that attribute the failures to a “frozen” market or investors’ “irrationality,” we find that (1) even at their height, less than 50% of ARS experienced auction failures, (2) the likelihood of auction failure was directly related to the level of the bonds’ “maximum auction rates,” (3) the implied market clearing yields of bonds with failed auctions were significantly above their maximum auction rates, and (4) ARS yields were generally higher than yields of various cash equivalent investment alternatives. We infer that investors priced the possibility of auctions failures into ARS yields and rationally declined to bid for bonds for which required market yields exceeded their maximum auction rates.

Contrary to earlier studies, we find that prior client performance is a significant determinant of the likelihood that an investment bank will be chosen as the advisor by future acquirers and of the changes through time in banks' shares of the advisory business. Further, the changes in the market values of acquirers at the announcement of acquisition attempts are positively correlated with contemporaneous changes in the market values of their advisors. Two implications arise: (1) acquirers consider advisors' prior client performance when choosing their advisors and (2) market forces work to align advisors' and clients' interests in the acquisition market.

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