James S. Ang, Kiritkumar A. Patel, Bond Rating Methods: Comparison and Validation, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 30, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, San Francisco, California, December 28-30, 1974 (May, 1975), pp. 631-640

Managers prefer investors who share similar expectations of their firms' prospects. Instead of taking the distribution of investor types as given, we investigate the question of how the managers may be able to effect a change in the pattern of ownership in a world where outside shareholders hold heterogeneous expectations. Under the requirements that the mechanism is costless to the firm and involves no initial cash transfer among the shareholders, the solution is a menu of securities in the form of sidebets among the shareholders. Ex post, the mechanism allows the high-valuation investors to own a greater proportion of the firm and be rewarded with a greater share of the firm's wealth gains.

We find, in a sample of 7581 merger offer announcements from 1990 to 2013, shareholders of 1283 (or 17%) target firms responded to the offer with negative market returns. These investors were disappointed at the offer, despite the price premium. To explain their disappointment, one must understand how target shareholders form expectations of premium to be received. We use a novel empirical design to find the relative weights of the rational vs. behavioral factors underlying the process of expectation formation. The estimated expected premiums are shown to have predictive power in the subsamples of both the positive and negative market responses. We also compare how the weights of the expectation factors change under different market conditions: hot vs. cold M&A regimes, bull vs. bear stock market, financial crisis vs. non-crisis periods, and dotcom bubble vs. no bubble.

We study a known negative signal, the sale of insider shares in an IPO and find that insiders adopt two concealment strategies consistent with wealth-maximizing behavior. First, insiders underreport the number of personally owned shares in the prominent original prospectus and use an obscure amendment to communicate the true higher level of shares to be offered. Second, when insiders increase shares in a later amendment, they tend to either increase secondary shares disproportional to primary share increases, or to reduce primary shares to wholly or partly conceal the increase in secondary shares offered. Insiders confound the negative secondary share signal by simultaneously sending a positive lockup signal.

The composite measures of investment performance: the reward-to-variability index, by Sharpe ([29], [30]) and Lintner [23], and the reward-to-volatility index, by Treynor [33], were developed after Markowitz ([24], [25]) and Tobin [32] popularized the mean-variance framework of analyzing the problems of certain investments. Since these are ex ante measures they are not directly applicable to the evaluation of ex post performance. A theoretical basis for doing so has been provided by Jensen ([17], [18]) who also developed another composite performance measure, the predictability index. In practice, these composite measures have been found to have problems. Foremost, they have been observed to exhibit systematic biases. Various causes of the biases have been proposed. These are: the existence of unequal lending and borrowing rates, the failure to consider higher moments of return distributions, and the elusive “true” holding period.

The authors provide evidence that taxes affect equity valuation by studying British investment trusts having otherwise identical classes of cash- and stock-dividend-paying shares outstanding. The authors study 1969-82, a period in which there were two dramatic changes in tax policy. They find that stock-dividend shares, which are convertible into cash-dividend shares, sell at premiums when the tax system favors capital gains and at discounts when the tax advantage of capital gains is reduced. After the 1975 elimination of the tax advantage to stock-dividend shares, the authors observe that investors convert virtually all stock-dividend shares into cash-dividend shares.

James S. Ang, Thomas Schwarz, Risk Aversion and Information Structure: An Experimental Study of Price Variability in the Securities Markets, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting American Finance Association, Dallas, Texas, December 28-30, 1984 (Jul., 1985), pp. 825-844