Previous research has determined that lockup provisions essentially defer sell-offs of shares by insiders, and therefore cause a pronounced decline in share price at the time the lockup provisions expire. However, some IPOs involve follow-on offerings that may allow some insiders to sell their shares before the lockup provision has expired. Our objective is to determine how follow-on offerings alter firm value above and beyond the typical lockup effects, and whether the effects are conditioned by firm-specific variables. We find that follow-on offerings elicit an average market response of 3.21% over a three-day period surrounding the filing date. In addition, the offerings experience adverse effects as of lockup expiration that are about 3.75% worse than other IPOs, after considering other factors. Based on the share price response at the time of the follow-on offering along with the share price response at the time of lockup expiration, the cumulative effects for IPOs complemented by follow-on offerings are about 6.96% weaker than for IPOs not complemented by follow-on offerings. Overall, follow-on offerings may benefit some insiders who can circumvent the lockup expiration date, at the expense of other investors.

We find that increases in implied market volatility (a proxy for market fear) have a significant impact on returns of bank stocks, above and beyond systematic risk proxied by the expected excess market return during a bad economic regime. Large bank returns are favorably affected by increases in implied market volatility during the crisis, while small banks are adversely affected by increases in implied market volatility. We attribute the different effects among the size-categorized bank portfolios to the perception that large banks are protected by too-big-to-fail policies. Within the sample of small banks, the adverse share price response to increased implied market volatility is more pronounced for banks that rely more heavily on non-traditional sources of funds, use a high proportion of loans in their assets, have a higher level of non-performing assets, and have a relatively low provision for loan losses. The adverse effect of negative innovations in implied market volatility on small bank returns during the crisis is primarily driven by exposure of their loan portfolio to weak economic conditions.

We investigate the informational role of the takeover premium as a forward looking price to expected synergies in the global market for corporate control. We find that premiums paid in the global market for corporate control are clustered in waves and driven to some extent by the US premium. International takeover premiums have become more responsive to US premiums as the globalization process evolved over time. Short-run divergent dynamics due to idiosyncratic or country-specific factors have become less severe, which suggests that expected synergies have become increasingly integrated in the global market for corporate control. Furthermore, we find that the region’s takeover premiums typically become more responsive to US takeover premiums when US economic conditions are relatively weak, when the US monetary policy is restrictive, when US credit risk is high, and when the region’s corporate governance (as measured by legal system quality and accounting quality) is high.