This paper studies the heterogeneous effects of subjective macroeconomic expectations on the cross-section of equity returns. We argue that an upward revision in expectations of macroeconomic productivity might be accompanied by an excessive increase in investment and external financing, inflated current equity prices, and thus lowered subsequent returns, particularly for financially constrained firms. Thus, following upward revisions in expectations of macroeconomic productivity, subsequent returns are relatively low for small firms, value firms, low-investment firms, risky firms, unprofitable firms, low-quality firms, and financially distressed firms—all of which are more financially constrained. In sharp contrast, following downward revisions in expectations of macroeconomic productivity, these categories of firms earn relatively high subsequent returns. We find that revisions in subjective macroeconomic expectations induce strong predictable time variation in a large set of anomalies. In particular, favorable revisions in expectations of macroeconomic productivity predict significantly stronger profitability, quality, distress, and low-risk anomalies but weaker value, investment, and size anomalies.

Buying is easier than shorting for many equity investors. Combining this arbitrage asymmetry with the arbitrage risk represented by idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) explains the negative relation between IVOL and average return. The IVOL‐return relation is negative among overpriced stocks but positive among underpriced stocks, with mispricing determined by combining 11 return anomalies. Consistent with arbitrage asymmetry, the negative relation among overpriced stocks is stronger, especially for stocks less easily shorted, so the overall IVOL‐return relation is negative. Further supporting our explanation, high investor sentiment weakens the positive relation among underpriced stocks and, especially, strengthens the negative relation among overpriced stocks.

We introduce uncertainty into Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to study optimal long-term contracting with learning. In a dynamic relationship, the agent’s shirking not only reduces current performance, but also increases the agent’s information rent due to the persistent belief manipulation effect. We characterize the optimal contract using the dynamic programming technique in which information rent is the unique state variable. In the optimal contract, the optimal effort is front-loaded and stochastically decreases over time. Furthermore, the optimal contract exhibits an option-like feature in that incentives increase after good performance. Implications about managerial incentives and asset management compensations are discussed. Received August 31, 2015; editorial decision October 20, 2016 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.

Exploiting a screen display feature whereby the order of stock display is determined by the stock's listing code, we lever a novel identification strategy and study how the interaction between overconfidence and limited attention affect asset pricing. We find that stocks displayed next to those with higher returns in the past two weeks are associated with higher returns in the future week, which are reverted in the long run. This is consistent with our conjectures that investors tend to trade more after positive investment experience and are more likely to pay attention to neighboring stocks, both confirmed using trading data.

Previous research has revealed that return spreads between stocks with high and low characteristics-based factor beta remain insignificant. This study investigates the time variation in the pricing of various characteristics-based factors, uncovering a notable two-regime pattern: high-beta portfolios yield higher returns than low-beta portfolios after high-sentiment periods, while the opposite occurs after low-sentiment periods. Remarkably, this two-regime pattern is completely reversed for macro factors. Mutual fund and hedge fund returns corroborate these findings. Our results suggest that exposure to characteristics-based factors likely represents mispricing levels, particularly during high-sentiment periods, whereas exposure to macro factors likely represents risk, particularly during low-sentiment periods.