In this paper, we examine the profitability of insider trading in firms whose securities trade in the OTC/NASDAQ market. Although the evidence suggests timing and forecasting ability on the part of insiders, high transaction costs (especially bid-ask spreads) appear to eliminate the potential for positive abnormal returns from active trading. By implication, outside investors who mimic the trading of insiders are also precluded from earning abnormal profits. In addition, we provide evidence on the determinants of insiders' profits. The data suggest that insiders closer to the firm trade on more valuable information than insiders removed from the firm.

ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine the profitability of insider trading in firms whose securities trade in the OTC/NASDAQ market. Although the evidence suggests timing and forecasting ability on the part of insiders, high transaction costs (especially bid‐ask spreads) appear to eliminate the potential for positive abnormal returns from active trading. By implication, outside investors who mimic the trading of insiders are also precluded from earning abnormal profits. In addition, we provide evidence on the determinants of insiders' profits. The data suggest that insiders closer to the firm trade on more valuable information than insiders removed from the firm.

ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine the stock price reactions to announcements of new security offerings by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). REITs offer a unique setting in which to study these events because they do not pay taxes at the firm level. Theory suggests that the net tax gain to corporate borrowing is unambiguously negative for a REIT. Contrary to some recent studies, however, we find a positive stock price reaction to debt offerings, while the negative equity‐issuance effect is preserved. Further empirical evidence lends support to signalling as the explanation for the positive significant debt‐issuance effect.

In this paper, we examine the stock price reactions to announcements of new security offerings by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). REITs offer a unique setting in which to study these events because they do not pay taxes at the firm level. Theory suggests that the net tax gain to corporate borrowing is unambiguously negative for a REIT. Contrary to some recent studies, however, we find a positive stock price reaction to debt offerings, while the negative equity-issuance effect is preserved. Further empirical evidence lends support to signalling as the explanation for the positive significant debt-issuance effect.

ABSTRACT Using more than 350,000 sell‐side analyst recommendations from January 1994 to August 2006, this paper examines the predictive content of aggregate analyst recommendations. We find that changes in aggregate analyst recommendations forecast future market excess returns after controlling for macroeconomic variables that have been shown to influence market returns. Similarly, changes in industry‐aggregated analyst recommendations predict future industry returns. Changes in aggregate analyst recommendations also predict one‐quarter‐ahead aggregate earnings growth. Overall, our results suggest that analyst recommendations contain market‐ and industry‐level information about future returns and earnings.

In this paper, we examine the foreign exchange exposure of a sample of U.S. and Japanese banking firms. Using daily data, we construct estimates of the exchange rate sensitivity of the equity returns of the U.S. bank holding companies and compare them to those of the Japanese banks. We find that the stock returns of a significant fraction of the U.S. companies move with the exchange rate, while few of the Japanese returns that we observe do so. We next examine more closely the sensitivity of the U.S. firms by linking the U.S. estimates cross-sectionally to accounting-based measures of currency risk. We suggest that the sensitivity estimates can provide a benchmark for assessing the adequacy of existing accounting measures of currency risk. Benchmarked in this way, the reported measures that we examine appear to provide a significant, though only partial, picture of the exchange rate exposure of U.S. banking institutions. The cross-sectional evidence is also consistent with the use of foreign exchange contracts for the purpose of hedging.