A dynamic model of a multistage investment project that captures many features of research and development (R&D) ventures and start-up companies is developed. An important feature these problems share is that firms learn about the potential profitability of the project throughout its life, but that technical uncertainty about the R&D effort is only resolved through additional investment. Consequently the risks associated with the ultimate cash flows have a systematic component even while the purely technical risks are idiosyncratic. Our model captures these different sources of risk and allows us to study their interaction in determining the value and risk premium of the venture.

The television game show The Price Is Right is used as a laboratory to conduct a preference-free test of rational decision theory in an environment with substantial economic incentives. It is found that contestants' strategies are transparently suboptimal. In response to this evidence, simple rules of thumb are developed that are shown to explain observed bidding patterns better than rational decision theory. Further, learning during the show reduces the frequency of strategic errors. This is interpreted as evidence of bounded rationality. Finally, there is no evidence that a concern for fairness significantly alters bidding behavior. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

The television game show The Price Is Right is used as a laboratory to conduct a preference-free test of rational decision theory in an environment with substantial economic incentives. It is found that contestants' strategies are transparently suboptimal. In response to this evidence, simple rules of thumb are developed which are shown to explain observed bidding patterns better than rational decision theory. Further, learning during the show reduces the frequency of strategic errors. This is interpreted as evidence of bounded rationality. Finally, there is no evidence that a concern for fairness significantly alters bidding behavior.

ABSTRACT We model a market for a skill in short supply and high demand, where the presence of charlatans (professionals who sell a service they do not deliver on) is an equilibrium outcome. In the model, reducing the number of charlatans through regulation lowers consumer surplus because of the resulting reduction in competition among producers. Producers can benefit from this reduction, potentially explaining the regulation we observe. The effect on total surplus depends on the type of regulation. We derive the factors that drive the cross‐sectional variation in charlatans (regulation) across professions.

As a consequence of optimal investment choices, a firm's assets and growth options change in predictable ways. Using a dynamic model, we show that this imparts predictability to changes in a firm's systematic risk, and its expected return. Simulations show that the model simultaneously reproduces: (i) the time‐series relation between the book‐to‐market ratio and asset returns; (ii) the cross‐sectional relation between book‐to‐market, market value, and return; (iii) contrarian effects at short horizons; (iv) momentum effects at longer horizons; and (v) the inverse relation between interest rates and the market risk premium.

ABSTRACT This paper shows that the existence of managerial ability, combined with the labor contract prevalent in the industry, implies that the closed‐end fund discount should exhibit many of the primary features documented in the literature. We evaluate the model's ability to match the quantitative features of the data, and find that it does well, although there is some observed behavior that remains to be explained.

As a consequence of optimal investment choices, a firm's assets and growth options change in predictable ways. Using a dynamic model, we show that this imparts predictability to changes in a firm's systematic risk, and its expected return. Simulations show that the model simultaneously reproduces: (i) the time‐series relation between the book‐to‐market ratio and asset returns; (ii) the cross‐sectional relation between book‐to‐market, market value, and return; (iii) contrarian effects at short horizons; (iv) momentum effects at longer horizons; and (v) the inverse relation between interest rates and the market risk premium.

ABSTRACT We establish an important role for the firm by studying capital reallocation decisions of mutual fund firms. The firm's decision to reallocate capital among its mutual fund managers adds at least $474,000 a month, which amounts to over 30% of the total value added of the industry. We provide evidence that this additional value added results from the firm's private information about the skill of its managers. The firm captures this value because investors reward the firm following a capital reallocation decision by allocating additional capital to the firm's funds.

ABSTRACT We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade‐off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage.