Sanctions are measures that one party (the sender) uses to influence another (the target). Sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, have been used by governments to alter the human rights, trade, or foreign policies of other governments. We develop notions of the sender's and target's toughness that depend on their patience and on the extent of their suffering from sanctions. How much a sender can exact from the target depends on the relative toughness of the two. Sanctions that impose less harm on the target can sometimes be more effective than those that impose greater harm.

Sanctions are measures that one party (the sender) uses to influence another (the target). Sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, have been used by governments to alter the human rights, trade, or foreign policies of other governments. We develop notions of the sender's and target's toughness that depend on their patience and on the extent of their suffering from sanctions. How much a sender can exact from the target depends on the relative toughness of the two. Sanctions that impose less harm on the target can sometimes be more effective than those that impose greater harm.

Journal Article Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly: Reply Get access Jonathan Eaton, Jonathan Eaton University of Virginia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Gene M. Grossman Gene M. Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 103, Issue 3, August 1988, Pages 603–607, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885548 Published: 01 August 1988

In this paper we provide an integrative treatment of the welfare effects of trade and industrial policy under oligopoly, and characterize qualitatively the form that optimal intervention takes under a variety of assumptions about the number of firms, their conjectures about the response of their rivals to their actions, the substitutability of their productsand the markets in which they are sold. We find that when no domestic consumption occurs optimal policy under duopoly with a single home firm depends on the difference between firms' actual responses to their rivals and the response that their rivals' conjecture. If conjectures are consistent , free trade is optimal. A tax or subsidy is indicated depending on the sign of the difference between the conjectured and the actual reponse.With more than one home firm but still no domestic consumption, an export tax is indicated if conjectures are consistent. Production subsidies and export tax-cum-subsidies can raise national welfare in the presence of domestic consumption, because these policies can mitigate the extent of the consumption distortion implicit in the deviation of price from marginal cost.

Jonathan Eaton, Harvey S. Rosen; Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Uncertainty*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 95, Issue 2, 1 September 1980, Pag

this paper is to analyze theoretically the effect of taxation on human capital accumulation in a model which explicitly allows for uncertainty