This paper presents the competitive equilibrium of an economy in which people hold money for transactions purposes. It studies both the steady states that result from different rates of monetary expansion and the effects of such non-steady-state events as an open-market operation. Even though the model features no uncertainty and perfect foresight, open-market operations affect aggregate output. In particular, a simultaneous increase in money and governmental holdings of capital temporarily raises aggregate capital and output while it lowers the real rate of interest on capital.

This paper presents the competitive equilibrium of an economy in which people hold money for transactions purposes. It studies both the steady states that result from different rates of monetary expansion and the effects of such non-steady-state events as an open-market operation. Even though the model features no uncertainty and perfect foresight, open-market operations affect aggregate output. In particular, a simultaneous increase in money and governmental holdings of capital temporarily raises aggregate capital and output while it lowers the real rate of interest on capital.

It has often been argued that prices are sticky in the United States. However, the empirical papers that have claimed to support this view have not reflected any formal behavioral theory. This paper presents a theory that justifies price stickiness, namely, that firms, fearing to upset their customers, attribute a cost to price changes. The rational expectations equilibrium of an economy with many such firms is presented, estimated with postwar U.S. data, and tested against alternative hypotheses. The results largely support the model. Furthermore, the hypothesis that prices are not sticky is rejected by U.S. data.

[It has often been argued that prices are sticky in the United States. However, the empirical papers that have claimed to support this view have not reflected any formal behavioral theory. This paper presents a theory that justifies price stickiness, namely, that firms, fearing to upset their customers, attribute a cost to price changes. The rational expectations equilibrium of an economy with many such firms is presented, estimated with postwar U.S. data, and tested against alternative hypotheses. The results largely support the model. Furthermore, the hypothesis that prices are not sticky is rejected by U.S. data.]

This paper presents a model in which inventories are used by a duopoly to deter deviations from an implicitly collusive arrangement. Higher inventories allow firms to punish cheaters more strongly and can thus help to maintain collusion. We show that when demand is high, the incentive to deviate increases so that increases in inventories may be optimal for the duopoly. This rationalizes the observed positive correlation between inventories and sales. In our empirical section we show that, as our model predicts, this correlation is more important in concentrated industries. We also provide several examples where inventories have been a factor in cartel behavior.

We study the movements in output, consumption and hours that are forecastable from a VAR and analyze how they differ from those predicted by standard real-business-cycle models. We show that actual forecastable movements in output have a variance about one hundred times larger than those predicted by the model. We also find that forecastable changes in the three series are strongly positively correlated with each other. On the other hand, for parameters whose implications are plausible in other respects, the model implies that output, consumption, and hours should not all be expected to move in the same direction.

Firms often concentrate on a narrow range of activities and claim to forgo other, apparently profitable, opportunities. This pursuit of narrow strategies is applauded by some academics who study strategic management. We present two related theoretical models in which firms do indeed benefit from pursuing such narrow strategies. In these models, a narrow strategy is beneficial because it enables the firm to motivate its employees to search for ways of increasing the profitability of its core activities. These benefits arise in our model because an incompleteness of contracts precludes offering similar incentives when the firm is involved in many activities.

This paper examines why monopolies change their normal prices less often than do tight oligopolies. We show that cost (demand) changes create a larger incentive for duopolists (monopolists) to change their prices. When both costs and demand are affected by small changes in the overall price level, the cost effect dominates. In the presence of a small, fixed cost of changing prices, therefore, duopolists change their prices in response to smaller perturbations in underlying conditions.

This paper studies implicitly colluding oligopolists facing fluctuatingdemand. The credible threat of future punishments provides the discipline that facilitates collusion. However, the authors find that the temptation to unilaterally deviate from the collusive outcome is often greater when demand is high. To moderate this temptation, the optimizing oligopoly reduces its profitability at such times, resultingin lower prices. The behavior of the railroads in the 1880s, the automobile industry in the 1950s, the cyclical behavior of cement prices, and of price-cost margins are consistent with this theory. Thereduction of price by the oligopolistic sectors may have macro consequences.