This paper investigates whether joint ventures and strategic alliances create value for bondholders by examining the bond market’s reaction to announcements of these two types of cooperative business activities. Based on 2964 announcements from 1985 to 2011, we find that joint ventures and strategic alliances create significant value for bondholders. The average two-month abnormal bond return is 0.64% for joint ventures and 0.70% for strategic alliances. We find no evidence of a wealth transfer between the bondholders and stockholders. We further explore the determinants of bond value creation through hypotheses on the synergy effect, the alleviation of financial constraints, and real options. The results of our study show that financial synergy is a main driver of bondholder wealth effects in joint ventures, while operating synergy is a dominant factor in strategic alliances. We also find evidence to support the real option hypothesis for both events. Finally, we show that the structure of bond contracts plays an important role in the link between synergy and abnormal bond returns.

We examine the consequences of shifting the IPO offer pricing power from securities regulators to market participants in a representative weak investor protection country, China. We show IPO offer prices relative to reported earnings are less depressed when determined by market participants than by securities regulators. IPO firms are also less likely to select a low quality auditor or inflate the pre-IPO earnings when IPO offer prices are determined by market participants. However, we find no evidence that IPO offerings are more likely to be overpriced when offer prices are determined by market participants. Furthermore, IPO firms' financial reporting choices made at the time of the IPO have a long lasting impact on the firms' subsequent financial reporting quality. Overall, our results contribute to the ongoing debate on the appropriate roles of securities regulators versus market forces in protecting public investors in markets with weak institutional environments.