The purpose of this note is to examine, theoretically, why the market risk premium (R^_ g\ raa y influence tests of asset pricing models with higher moments.When moments of higher order than the variance are added to a pricing model developed within the usual two-fund separation assump- tions, the market risk premium enters the pricing equation in a nonlinear fashion and is implicit in the estimation of each moment's coefficient.Unless this nonlinearity is recognized, incorrect conclusions regarding the tests of such models may result.

We study the underpricing and long-term performance of A- and B-share initial public offerings (IPOs) issued in China during the 1993–1998 period. The average underpricing for A- and B share IPOs are 178% and 11.6%, respectively. The underpricing of A-share IPOs is positively related to the number of days between the offering and the listing and the number of stock investors in the province from which the IPO comes, and negatively related to the number of shares being issued. None of these characteristics explain the underpricing of B-share IPOs. In the long run, A-share IPOs slightly underperform the size- and/or book/market (B/M)-matched portfolios while B-shares outperform the benchmark portfolios.

A number of studies of U.S. stock returns document what is referred to as the investment or asset growth effect. Specifically, firms that increase investment or total assets subsequently earn lower risk-adjusted returns. This study finds substantial cross-country differences in the asset growth effect. In particular, the asset growth effect is stronger in countries with more developed financial markets, but it does not seem to be associated with corporate governance or the costs of trading. Overall, the evidence is consistent with a q-theory where financial market development captures either managers’ willingness or ability to align investment expenditures to the cost of capital, but it is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the asset growth effect is due to bad governance and overinvestment.

We test the implications of anchoring bias associated with forecast earnings per share (FEPS) for forecast errors, earnings surprises, stock returns, and stock splits. We find that analysts make optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts when a firm’s FEPS is lower (higher) than the industry median. Further, firms with FEPS greater (lower) than the industry median experience abnormally high (low) future stock returns, particularly around subsequent earnings announcement dates. These firms are also more likely to engage in stock splits. Finally, split firms experience more positive forecast revisions, more negative forecast errors, and more negative earnings surprises after stock splits.

This paper examines the price and volume effects of underlying stocks around the announcement date of derivative warrants issued in Hong Kong. In general, the results indicate that underlying stocks are subject to extra buying pressure a few days before the new derivative warrant issuance, which is consistent with our hypothesis about the hedging effect created by the merchant banks that initiate the warrant issuance. Since the prices of underlying stocks peak on the first day after the warrant announcement and are stable thereafter, the information effect associated with the warrant issuance appears to be weak and does not last long. In addition, we find that underlying stocks have abnormal increases in price and volume during the last 5 minutes of trading on the warrant issuance day. This might be due to investors’ buying behavior precipitated by information leakage about the successful warrant issuance and/or to the price manipulation by merchant banks in order to attain a better payoff from the warrant issuing business.

In a recent study, Tinic and West (1986) empirically reexamine the risk-return relationship posited by the traditional mean-variance CAPM. They find a positive nonlinear relationship between risk and return, except during January when the market rewards bearing nonsystematic risk. This study examines the hypothesis that nonnormality of return distributions may account for some of these anomalous results. We compare Shalit and Yitzhaki's (1984) mean-extended Gini CAPM—an equilibrium asset pricing relation that is independent of the form of the underlying asset distribution—with the traditional CAPM. Our results indicate that the nonlinear risk-return relationship and the size and January effects are robust to nonnormality of return distributions.

Cheng F. Lee, Chunchi Wu, K. C. John Wei, The Heterogeneous Investment Horizon and the Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Implications, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Sep., 1990), pp. 361-376

We examine the value and efficiency of analyst recommendations through the lens of capital market anomalies. We find that analysts do not fully use the information in anomaly signals when making recommendations. Analysts tend to give more favorable consensus recommendations to stocks classified as overvalued and, more important, these stocks subsequently tend to have particularly negative abnormal returns. Analysts whose recommendations are better aligned with anomaly signals are more skilled and elicit stronger recommendation announcement returns. Our findings suggest that analysts’ biased recommendations could be a source of market friction that impedes the efficient correction of mispricing.

Models of political risk predict that increases in political uncertainty cause stock prices to fall, especially for politically sensitive firms. We use the event of the Bo Xilai political scandal in 2012 in China as an exogenous shock to identify the impact of political uncertainty on asset prices. We document that the Bo scandal caused a significant drop in stock prices, especially for firms that are more politically sensitive. Further analysis shows that the stock price drop is mainly driven by a change in discount rate, providing strong support for the existence of priced political risk.