We show that subjective assessments of employee “potential” contribute to gender gaps in promotion and pay. Using data on 29,809 management-track employees from a large retail chain, we find that women receive substantially lower potential ratings despite receiving higher performance ratings. Differences in potential ratings account for approximately half of the gender promotion gap. Women’s lower potential ratings do not reflect accurate forecasts of future performance: Women subsequently outperform male colleagues, both on average and on the margin of promotion. We highlight two mechanisms driving the gender potential gap: strategic retention and stereotyping. (JEL J16, J31, J71, L81, M12, M51)

We find consistent evidence of negative autocorrelation in decision making that is unrelated to the merits of the cases considered in three separate high-stakes field settings: refugee asylum court decisions, loan application reviews, and Major League Baseball umpire pitch calls. The evidence is most consistent with the law of small numbers and the gambler’s fallacy—people underestimating the likelihood of sequential streaks occurring by chance—leading to negatively autocorrelated decisions that result in errors. The negative autocorrelation is stronger among more moderate and less experienced decision makers, following longer streaks of decisions in one direction, when the current and previous cases share similar characteristics or occur close in time, and when decision makers face weaker incentives for accuracy. Other explanations for negatively autocorrelated decisions such as quotas, learning, or preferences to treat all parties fairly are less consistent with the evidence, though we cannot completely rule out sequential contrast effects as an alternative explanation.

The best worker is not always the best candidate for manager. In these cases, do firms promote the best potential manager or the best worker in their current job? Using microdata on the performance of sales workers at 131 firms, we find evidence consistent with the Peter Principle, which proposes that firms prioritize current job performance in promotion decisions at the expense of other observable characteristics that better predict managerial performance. We estimate that the costs of promoting workers with lower managerial potential are high, suggesting either that firms are making inefficient promotion decisions or that the benefits of promotion-based incentives are great enough to justify the costs of managerial mismatch. We find that firms manage the costs of the Peter Principle by placing less weight on sales performance in promotion decisions when managerial roles entail greater responsibility and when frontline workers are incentivized by strong pay for performance.

ABSTRACT Using granular data covering both regulated (brokerage‐financed) and unregulated (shadow‐financed) margin accounts in China, we provide novel evidence on retail investors' margin trading behavior and its price implications. We first show that retail investors' decisions to lever up in stock trading despite the hefty borrowing cost is related to their lottery preferences. We then show that margin borrowing affects investors' trading behavior—investors are more likely to liquidate their holdings as they approach margin calls. Finally, we show that margin‐induced trading aggregates to affect asset prices and contributes to shock spillovers across stocks (e.g., from lottery stocks to nonlottery stocks).