ABSTRACT Price limit advocates claim that price limits decrease stock price volatility, counter overreaction, and do not interfere with trading activity. Conversely, price limit critics claim that price limits cause higher volatility levels on subsequent days (volatility spillover hypothesis), prevent prices from efficiently reaching their equilibrium level (delayed price discovery hypothesis), and interfere with trading due to limitations imposed by price limits (trading interference hypothesis). Empirical research does not provide conclusive support for either positions. We examine the Tokyo Stock Exchange price limit system to test these hypotheses. Our evidence supports all three hypotheses suggesting that price limits may be ineffective.

Price limit advocates claim that price limits decrease stock price volatility, counter overreaction, and do not interfere with trading activity. Conversely, price limit critics claim that price limits cause higher volatility levels on subsequent days (volatility spillover hypothesis), prevent prices from efficiently reaching their equilibrium level (delayed price discovery hypothesis), and interfere with trading due to limitations imposed by price limits (trading interference hypothesis). Empirical research does not provide conclusive support for either positions. We examine the Tokyo Stock Exchange price limit system to test these hypotheses. Our evidence supports all three hypotheses suggesting that price limits may be ineffective.

We develop and test an ownership structure pecking order. Our ownership pecking order sorts out which structures are likely to have relatively fewer agency costs versus higher agency costs. At the top of the pecking order are firms with a single controlling shareholder, they have the lowest agency costs when that shareholder is not the government. Next is the presence of multiple large shareholders. They are even more effective when the large shareholders are of the same type. The structure with the highest agency costs consists of a single large non-controlling shareholder. Our empirical tests confirm this pecking order.

We find a positive relation between product market competition and corporate investment using a sample of Chinese manufacturing firms during 1999–2010. A quasi-natural experiment and change regressions yield consistent evidence. We postulate that China's high and predictable growth rate, as it transitions from a developing economy to a developed economy, is what drives the positive relation between competition and investment. We directly test and provide support for this growth-oriented explanation. We also find that high investment under high competition is a value-enhancing proposition for firms. Finally, we test whether some firm types are more likely to invest under high competition in a growing economy, and we find that firms with high predation risk and firms that are industry leaders invest more.

We study whether a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it obtain loans. In China, Regulation No. 18 (announced in 2013) prohibits all high-level government officials from being independent directors of firms. As a result, many firms lost their political connections. We find that after firms lose their politically connected independent directors, firms having no social connections to banks experience, on average, a 12% decrease in the bank loan ratio relative to the median ratio; but those whose board chairs or CEOs are socially connected to local bank branch heads experience a 22% increase in the loan ratio relative to the median. However, this positive effect is short lived and thus not a new equilibrium. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it get bank financing.