This paper empirically examines one motive for takeovers: to change control of firms that make acquisitions that diminish the value of their equity. Firms that subsequently become takeover targets make acquisitions that significantly reduce their equity value, and firms that do not become takeover targets make acquisitions that raise their equity value. Within the sample of acquisition by targets, the acquisitions that reduce equity value the most are those that are later divested either in bust-up takeovers or restructuring programs to thwart the takeover. This evidence is consistent with theories advanced by Marris, Manne, and Jensen concerning the disciplinary role played by takeovers.

In 1931, California became the last U.S. state to adopt limited liability. Prior to that, from its inception as a state in 1849, stockholders of California corporations faced pro rata unlimited liability. California's unique liability rule during 1849–1931 provides a natural experiment for testing Woodward's (1985) and Alchian and Woodward's (1987, 1988) hypothesis that limited liability reduces transaction costs and facilitates the transferability of shares. Using a small sample of publicly traded California firms and a corresponding sample of benchmark companies, we find that trading volume and share turnover were significantly lower for California firms when California had unlimited liability. After California adopted limited liability, trading volume and share turnover increased significantly for California firms relative to non-California firms. In addition, bid–ask spreads were significantly higher for California firms during the period of unlimited liability and they declined for California firms relative to non-California firms after California adopted limited liability. The results support Alchian and Woodward's hypothesis that limited liability reduces transaction costs and promotes the transferability of shares.

Two recent papers document a significant relation between valuation multiples and governance indices during the 1990s. We test whether causation runs from governance to valuation or vice versa. We find that valuation multiples during the early 1980s, a period preceding the adoption of the provisions comprising the governance indices, are highly correlated with valuation multiples during the 1990s. After controlling for valuation multiples during 1980–1985, no significant relation exists between contemporaneous valuation multiples and governance indices during the 1990s. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms with low valuation multiples were more likely to adopt provisions comprising the governance indices, not that the adoption of these provisions depresses valuation multiples.

In the period surrounding World War I, US firms sharply increased investment in fixed assets and working capital to accommodate large increases in demand associated with the war. Concurrently, the US adopted an excess profits tax, which created a tax bias in favor of equity financing. Despite this tax bias, firms in need of external funds largely issued debt, not equity, to finance investment spikes when the excess profits tax was in effect. Further, we find these firms systematically reduced debt after the war, whereas other firms did not. The results support models that link the dynamics of firms’ financing decisions with the dynamics of their investment opportunities and are inconsistent with models that emphasize taxes as a primary determinant of financing decisions.

Dual-class recapitalizations and leveraged buyouts have similar effects on ownership of corporate voting rights but very different effects on ownership of residual claims. We predict that firms with greater growth opportunities, lower agency costs, and lower tax liability are more likely to consolidate control through dual-class recapitalizations. We find strong support for the growth hypothesis and weaker support for the other hypotheses. These results increase our understanding of the causes of change in organizational form by illustrating that the method and effects of consolidating corporate control are systematically related to firm attributes.

The U.S. defense industry provides a natural experiment for examining how changes in growth opportunities affect the level and structure of corporate debt. The growth opportunities of defense firms, compared with other firms, increased substantially during the Reagan defense buildup of the early 1980s but then declined significantly with the end of the cold war and associated defense budget cuts in the late 1980s and early 1990s. We examine how the level and structure of corporate debt changed for a sample of 61 defense firms and a benchmark sample of 61 manufacturing firms during 1980–95, a period spanning the changes in growth opportunities. The debt levels of weapons manufacturers, which were most affected by the changes in growth opportunities, increased significantly as their growth opportunities declined. In addition, these firms lengthened the maturity structure of their debt, decreased the ratio of private to public debt, and decreased the use of senior debt as their growth opportunities declined. The results complement other studies that have found cross-sectional relations between proxies for growth opportunities and leverage variables and validate the prominent role played by growth opportunities in the theory of corporate finance.

In the first round of the Czech privatization scheme, the authorities set a uniform share price for all companies, creating a natural experiment for testing several hypotheses concerning the determinants of share demand. We find a positive relation between first-round share demand and later stock market prices, supporting use of share demand to measure relative share values. We find that share demand is related to proxies for agency costs and the expected costs of financial distress. Interestingly, share demand is directly related to the percentage of shares held by insiders, which is relevant for the debate in former Communist countries over whether privatization programs should restrict insider holdings.

We examine the relation between bidder returns and the probability of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in acquiring firms. Using a sample of 714 acquisitions during 1990 to 1998, we find that 47% of CEOs of acquiring firms are replaced within 5 years, including 27% by internal governance, 16% by takeovers, and 4% by bankruptcy. A significant inverse relation exists between bidder returns and the likelihood of CEO turnover. This relation is not associated with governance structure. It also is not significantly different in stock versus cash acquisitions, which appears to be inconsistent with Shleifer and Vishny's theory of “stock market driven” acquisitions.

We empirically examine whether risk-taking by publicly traded US companies declined significantly after adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Several provisions of SOX are likely to discourage risk-taking, including an expanded role for independent directors, an increase in director and officer liability, and rules related to internal controls. We find several measures of risk-taking decline significantly for US versus non-US firms after SOX. The magnitudes of the declines are related to several firm characteristics, including pre-SOX board structure, firm size, and R&D expenditures. The evidence is consistent with the proposition that SOX discourages risk-taking by public US companies.

We examine the relation between the trust that employees have in management and the M&A activity of firms. We measure this trust by using rankings compiled by the Great Place to Work Institute (GPWI) from 1998 to 2011. Although the volume of M&A activity is not significantly different for firms with strong cultures of trust (“SCT firms”) versus other firms, the relative size of acquisitions announced by SCT firms is significantly smaller than the size of acquisitions announced by other firms. Furthermore, when SCT firms announce relatively large acquisitions, bidder returns and the percent change in the combined values of bidders and targets are lower than the corresponding returns for other firms. Finally, when SCT firms make large acquisitions, they are significantly more likely to suffer a loss in their GPWI ranking as compared with other SCT firms. Overall, the results are consistent with the conclusion that the M&A policies of firms are influenced by a culture of trust between employees and management.