This paper develops a closed-form option valuation formula for a spot asset whose variance follows a GARCH (p, q) process that can be correlated with the returns of the spot asset. It provides the first readily computed option formula for a random volatility model that can be estimated and implemented solely on the basis of observables. The single lag version of this model contains Heston's (1993) stochastic volatility model as a continuous-time limit. Empirical analysis on S&P500 index options shows that the out-of-sample valuation errors from the single lag version of the GARCH model are substantially lower than the ad hoc Black-Scholes model of Dumas, Fleming and Whaley (1998) that uses a separate implied volatility for each option to fit to the smirk/smile in implied volatilties. The GARCH model remains superior even though the parameters of the GARCH model are held constant and volatility is filtered from the history of asset prices while the ad hoc Black-Scholes model is updated every period. The improvement is largely due to the ability of the GARCH model to simultaneously capture the correlation of volatility with spot returns and the path dependence in volatility.

Optimal ownership structure is an important issue in corporate governance debates. This study uses piece-wise regression analysis to examine the impact of ownership structure on the risk of CEO compensation. We show that when the CEO and the board of directors control low levels of voting stock (i.e., below 13% of total shares) increases in ownership are positively related to CEO compensation risk. For ownership levels above 13% but below 22%, increases in ownership are negatively related to CEO compensation risk. This evidence provides a partial explanation for the non-monotonic relationship between Tobin's Q and management ownership observed by Morck et al. (1988) [Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 293–316.].

We study the acquisition and divestiture activity of a sample of 1305 firms from 59 industries during the 1990–1999 period. Consistent with the importance of restructuring activity during the 1990s, we find that half of the sample firms are acquired or engage in a major divestiture. Consistent with the notion that economic change is a source of the observed restructuring activity, we find significant industry clustering in both acquisitions and divestitures. We also study the announcement effects of the two forms of restructuring and find that both acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990s increase shareholder wealth. Moreover, the wealth effects for both acquisitions and divestitures are directly related to the relative size of the event. The symmetric, positive wealth effects for acquisitions and divestitures are consistent with a synergistic explanation for both forms of restructuring and are inconsistent with nonsynergistic models based on entrenchment, empire building and hubris.

We extend the literature on director independence and the role of the board by focusing on the importance of audit committees in the contracting process. We find that the demand for independent and active audit committees is positively related to the demand for accounting certification. In particular, we find that the likelihood of a firm having a completely independent and active audit committee is negatively related to firm growth opportunities and managerial ownership and positively related to firm size and leverage. Our results suggest that audit committees are an important organizational construct related to the demand for accounting certification.

We combine two experiments and a survey to measure trust and trustworthiness—two key components of social capital. Standard attitudinal survey questions about trust predict trustworthy behavior in our experiments much better than they predict trusting behavior. Trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by past trusting behavior outside of the experiments. When individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise. Trustworthiness declines when partners are of different races or nationalities. High status individuals are able to elicit more trustworthiness in others.

This paper examines policies and procedures put in place by corporations to regulate trading in the stock by the firm's own insiders. Over 92% of our sample companies have their own policies restricting trading by insiders, and 78% have explicit blackout periods during which the company prohibits trading by its insiders. Our data indicate that blackout periods successfully suppress trading, both purchases and sales, by insiders, and that the blackout period is associated with a bid–ask spread that's narrower by about two basis points. Consistent with this effect on the spread, allowed insider trades are modestly more profitable than insider trades made during prohibited blackout periods.

We study price discrimination where consumers know at the time of contracting only the distribution of their valuations but subsequently learn their actual valuations. Consumers are sequentially screened, as in a menu of refund contracts. Initial valuation uncertainty can differ in terms of first-order stochastic dominance or mean-preserving-spread. In both cases, optimal mechanisms depend on informativeness of consumers' initial knowledge about their valuations, not on uncertainty that affects all consumers. It can be optimal to “subsidize” consumers with smaller valuation uncertainty through low refund to reduce the rent to those who face greater uncertainty and purchase more “flexible” contracts.

The rapid expansion of organized equity exchanges in both emerging and developed markets has prompted policymakers to raise important questions about their macroeconomic impact, yet the need to focus on recent data poses implementation difficulties for econometric studies of dynamic interactions between stock markets and economic performance in individual countries. This paper overcomes some of these difficulties by applying recent developments in the analysis of panels with a small time dimension to estimate vector autoregressions for a set of 47 countries with annual data for 1980–1995. After describing recent theories on the role of stock markets in growth and considering a pure cross-sectional empirical approach, our panel VARs show leading roles for stock market liquidity and the intensity of activity in traditional financial intermediaries on per capita output. The findings underscore the potential gains associated with developing deep and liquid financial markets in an increasingly global economy.

We study cost pass-through in the U.S. automobile market using a framework that incorporates the effects of cost changes on input decisions. We find that accounting for firms' factor-market decisions significantly increases measured cost pass-through, although we reject the hypothesis of full cost pass-through and constant markups. In addition, our evidence suggests that cost shocks common to all manufacturers have a greater effect on prices than do model-specific cost shocks. Finally, we examine how pass-through varies with manufacturer nationality, finding that U.S. firm cost pass-through exceeds that of European and Asian firms.