Recently, a number of researchers (Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Christiano et al., 1996a,b, 1997; Evans and Marshall, 1998; Strongin, 1995; Pagan and Robertson, 1995; Brunner, 1994) claim to have found evidence of a statistically significant liquidity effect in a recursive structural VAR using nonborrowed reserves (NBR). It is claimed that innovations to NBR reflect the exogenous policy actions of the Fed. This paper argues that the opposite is true. Specifically, I show that the Fed has an incentive to offset bank-initiated discount window borrowing when it implements the Federal Open Market Committee’s policy directive, and that it has done so since the late 1950s. This practice has created a negative contemporaneous covariance between NBR and the funds rate that has been incorrectly attributed to the liquidity effect. By showing that these models capture the endogenous response of the Fed to bank borrowing on NBR, rather than the effect of exogenous policy actions on the funds rate, this paper also resolves the puzzle of the vanishing liquidity effect noted by Pagan and Robertson (1995) and Christiano (1995).

The 1991 amendment to the auditor appointment requirement of section 86 of the Ontario Municipal Act removes certain barriers to entry into the Ontario municipal audit market. The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that the amendment has enhanced competition in this market. The results indicate that there is a general reduction in the real municipal audit fees compared with the pre-amendment levels, and that the market has become more contestable following the amendment. Notwithstanding the heightened competition, the Big 6 audit firms continue to command audit fee premiums over the non-Big 6 audit firms. This suggests that Big 6 audit fee premiums possibly reflect brand name reputation rather than monopoly/oligopoly rents.

The 1991 amendment to the auditor appointment requirement of section 86 of the Ontario Municipal Act removes certain barriers to entry into the Ontario municipal audit market. The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that the amendment has enhanced competition in this market. The results indicate that there is a general reduction in the real municipal audit fees compared with the pre‐amendment levels, and that the market has become more contestable following the amendment. Notwithstanding the heightened competition, the Big 6 audit firms continue to command audit fee premiums over the non‐Big 6 audit firms. This suggests that Big 6 audit fee premiums possibly reflect brand name reputation rather than monopoly/oligopoly rents.

This study focuses on changes in incentives at the William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration in the early 1990s to redirect effort from academic research to classroom teaching. We find a substantial and almost immediate jump in teaching ratings following the changes in incentives. Longer-run learning and turnover effects are present. Evidence also suggests that research output fell. This case illustrates the power of organizational incentives to redirect effort in a multitask environment, even in the presence of apparent human–capital constraints.

This paper shows bank mergers that enhance value upon announcement can be distinguished from those that do not create value. I classify mergers of banking firms according to activity and geographic similarity (focus) or dissimilarity (diversification), and examine the abnormal returns to each group as a result of the merger announcement. Mergers that focus both activity and geography enhance stockholder value by 3.0% while the other types do not create value. Analysis reveals that abnormal returns upon merger announcement increase in relative size of target to bidder, but decrease in the pre-merger performance of targets.

The directional output distance function (Chambers, Chung, & Färe, 1996) is used to construct a Malmquist-Luenberger index of total factor productivity growth for manufacturing when both good and bad outputs are jointly produced. The index is constructed using information on good and bad output quantities and input quantities, circumventing the problem of recovering shadow price information for the bad output needed for the Fisher or Tornqvist type of productivity indices. Accounting for toxic releases in manufacturing, productivity growth averages 1.4% an-nually during 1988–1994. The findings also suggest that the failure to account for toxic releases in manufacturing results in a significant under-statement of total factor productivity growth.

We examine a market in which long-lived firms face a short-term incentive to exert low effort, but could earn higher profits if it were possible to commit to high effort. There are two types of firms, "inept" firms who can only exert low effort, and "competent" firms who have a choice between high and low effort. There is occasional exit, and competent and inept potential entrants compete for the right to inherit the departing firm's reputation. Consumers receive noisy signals of effort choice, and so competent firms choose high effort in an attempt to distinguish themselves from inept firms. A competent firm is most likely to enter the market by purchasing an average reputation, in the hopes of building it into a good reputation, than either a very low reputation or a very high reputation. Inept firms, in contrast, find it more profitable to either buy high reputations and deplete them or buy low reputations.