This study complements and extends prior decision aid (DA) research by examining the DA reliance behavior of professional buy-side financial analysts in the context of their actual work environment. A large mutual fund company provided data on buy-side analysts' earnings forecasts over the course of one year, during which forecasts were made at the end of each quarter for the following four consecutive quarters. As part of the decision process, all analysts could voluntarily access a DA to assist them in forecasting earnings. Consistent with extant DA theory, the results indicate that analysts with greater performance-contingent incentives were less likely to rely on the DA and analysts with more complex portfolios were more likely to rely on the DA. Contrary to the results of most DA research and inconsistent with extant DA theory, analysts with greater task ability relied more on the DA than analysts with lesser ability. Finally, when DA reliance was high, analysts' forecast accuracy was also high, regardless of DA accuracy. The results provide valuable insight into the use of DAs by professional decision makers and the influence of DA reliance on their judgments in light of real-world pressures and performance consequences. The theoretical and practical implications of this study call for more research into why, how, and under what conditions highly skilled knowledge workers rely on the advice of DAs.

[We use daily short-selling data to examine whether short selling around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) reflects informed or manipulative trading. Around SEO announcements, we find no evidence of informed short selling. Around issue dates, higher levels of preissue short selling are significantly related to larger issue discounts for non-shelf-registered offerings. This evidence is consistent with manipulative trading. We show that SEC Rule 105 constrains some but not all manipulative trading. Our results reverse previous research that uses monthly short-interest data, because daily data allow more powerful tests. Our evidence helps explain the increased popularity of shelf registrations. Although short selling usually enhances price efficiency, we document a situation where short selling reduces price efficiency.]

In the context of certain models, it is possible to infer the elasticity of labor supply to the firm from the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the wage. We use this strategy to estimate the elasticity of labor supply for men and women workers at a chain of grocery stores, identifying separation elasticities from differences in wages and separation rates across different job titles within the firm. We estimate that women have lower elasticities, so a Robinson‐style monopsony model can explain reasonably well the lower relative pay of women in the retail grocery industry.

One dimension of competition among stock exchanges is the quality of products they have to offer. In order to attract listings and trading volume, exchanges can affect the quality of their listed firms by altering their standards for firm disclosure and governance. We identify a competition with respect to delisting standards between Korea's two stock exchanges and show that it complies with the three components of a regulatory race to the top: external trigger, mobility among diverse regimes and meaningful changes that converge to similar rules. The race between the two Korean exchanges ended with stricter rules and better protected minority shareholders. The race also ended, however, with neither exchange gaining market share with respect to trading volume or new listings. Korea's experience, therefore, suggests a reason why these races are rare. In the absence of an external trigger, exchanges will be reluctant to enter a race if they think it will result in rule convergence and no winner.

Abstract We develop an equilibrium model in a 2-country, 2-good, pure exchange economy in which investors with logarithmic utility functions have heterogeneous beliefs about exogenously given output or endowment processes. We obtain closed-form representations of real exchange rates and of stock prices. We show that heterogeneous beliefs together with heterogeneous preferences make the volatility of real exchange rates and of stocks exhibit some properties that have been well documented in the empirical literature. These properties include the high volatility of both real exchange rates and stocks compared with that of economic fundamentals, the high correlation of stocks during periods of volatile markets. The model can also generate the clustering of the volatility of foreign exchange rates and stocks if the differences of beliefs are clustering.

We investigate the equity valuation effects of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006). The PPA 2006 has two main provisions: (1) firms must fully fund their pension plans within seven years (previously allowed 30 years to fund 90 percent of the pension liability) and (2) firms receive a tax deduction for contributions up to 150 percent of the pension liability (previously 100 percent). After controlling for the effects of SFAS 158, growth opportunities, the cost of external funds, and other information released during our sample period, we examine pension firms’ abnormal returns surrounding key dates in the legislative process leading to the adoption of the PPA 2006. First, we find a mean negative abnormal return of −4.20 percent during the period in which the PPA 2006 was first voted on by Congress. The mean (median) firm in our sample experienced a $310 million ($60 million) decline in market capitalization. Second, we find that the valuation effect was more negative for firms with larger unfunded pension liabilities and larger capital expenditure requirements, while firms with higher marginal tax rates experienced a positive effect. Third, we find no evidence of differential valuation effects for firms in different “at risk” categories as defined by the PPA 2006. Finally, we find a significant number of pension freezes occurred during our sample period. Our results are stronger when excluding these firms from our sample.

We investigate the equity valuation effects of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (hereafter PPA 2006). The PPA 2006 has two main provisions: (1) firms must fully fund their pension plans within seven years (previously allowed 30 years to fund 90 percent of the pension liability), and (2) firms receive a tax deduction for contributions up to 150 percent of the pension liability (previously 100 percent). After controlling for the effects of SFAS 158, growth opportunities, the cost of external funds and other information released during our sample period, we examine pension firms' abnormal returns surrounding key dates in the legislative process leading to the adoption of the PPA 2006. First, we find a mean negative abnormal return of -4.20 percent during the period in which the PPA 2006 was first voted on by Congress. The mean (median) firm in our sample experienced a $310 million ($60 million) decline in market capitalization. Second, we find that the valuation effect was more negative for firms with larger unfunded pension liabilities and larger capital expenditure requirements, while firms with higher marginal tax rates experienced a positive effect. Third, we find no evidence of differential valuation effects for firms in different at risk categories as defined by the PPA 2006. Finally, we find a significant number of pension freezes occurred during our sample period. Our results are stronger when excluding these firms from our sample.

Les auteurs étudient les répercussions de la Pension Protection Act de 2006 (PPA 2006) sur la valeur boursière des actions. La PPA 2006 contient deux dispositions principales : 1) les entreprises doivent assurer la capitalisation intégrale de leur régime de retraite en sept ans (alors qu’une période de trente ans leur était auparavant accordée pour capitaliser 90 pour cent de leur passif au titre du régime) et 2) elles peuvent se prévaloir d’une déduction fiscale à l’égard des cotisations à concurrence de 150 pour cent du passif au titre du régime (alors que le plafond de la déduction était antérieurement de 100 pour cent). Une fois contrôlés l’incidence de la norme SFAS 158, les possibilités de croissance, le coût du financement externe et les autres informations publiées au cours de la période d’échantillonnage, les auteurs examinent les rendements anormaux des entreprises ayant un régime de retraite, à proximité des dates marquantes du processus législatif ayant menéà l’adoption de la PPA 2006. Premièrement, ils observent un rendement anormal moyen négatif de – 4,20 pour la période au cours de laquelle la PPA 2006 a fait l’objet d’un premier vote au Congrès. La capitalisation boursière de l’entreprise moyenne (médiane) de l’échantillon a enregistré un déclin de 310 millions de dollars (60 millions de dollars). Deuxièmement, les auteurs constatent que les répercussions sur la valeur boursière sont plus négatives dans le cas des entreprises présentant des passifs non capitalisés plus importants au titre du régime et devant faire face à des dépenses en immobilisations plus substantielles, alors que les entreprises dont les taux d’imposition marginaux sont plus élevés enregistrent des répercussions positives. Troisièmement, les auteurs ne relèvent aucun élément permettant d’affirmer que les répercussions sur la valeur boursière varient selon les différentes catégories de risque définies par la PPA 2006. Enfin, ils recensent un nombre appréciable de cas de blocage du régime au cours de la période soumise à l’étude. Les résultats sont plus marqués encore lorsque ces entreprises sont retirées de l’échantillon.