[We analyze complex bond portfolios within the framework of a dynamic general equilibrium asset-pricing model. Equilibrium bond portfolios are nonsensical and imply a trading volume that vastly exceeds observed trading volume on financial markets. Instead, portfolios that combine bond ladders with a market portfolio of equity assets are nearly optimal investment strategies. The welfare loss of these simple investment strategies, when compared to the equilibrium portfolio, converges to zero as the length of the bond ladder increases. This article, therefore, provides a rationale for naming bond ladders as a popular bond investment strategy.]

Economic evaluations of alternative electric generating technologies typically rely on comparisons between their expected “levelized cost” per MWh supplied. I demonstrate that this metric is inappropriate for comparing intermittent generating technologies like wind and solar with dispatchable generating technologies like nuclear, gas combined cycle, and coal. It overvalues intermittent generating technologies compared to dispatchable base load generating technologies. It also likely overvalues wind generating technologies compared to solar generating technologies. Integrating differences in production profiles, the associated variations in wholesale market prices of electricity, and life-cycle costs associated with different generating technologies is necessary to provide meaningful comparisons between them.

We explore whether government ownership affects the cost of debt using a sample of fully and partially privatized companies. On average across firms, a one-percentage-point decrease in government ownership is associated with an increase in the credit spread, used as a proxy for the cost of debt, by three-quarters of a basis point. However, fully privatized companies exhibit lower credit spreads than partially privatized firms, indicating the cost of a lengthy privatization process. Empirical evidence suggests that these findings result from decreasing government guarantees, firm performance improvements, ownership uncertainty, and bondholder-shareholder conflicts. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

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Although prior research presents employees’ subjective valuations of their stock options as being either below or above firms’ opportunity cost of issuing options, we examine subjective valuations in terms of their distribution around cost. We argue that variation of subjective valuations within this distribution is at least partly attributable to employees’ failure to fully incorporate the time-value component of options and their tendency to, instead, anchor on readily-available components of option value. Using both “real-world” and experiment data, we show that a significant proportion of both employees (30 percent) and experiment participants (47 percent) anchor on three readily-available values, two of which lie below cost (zero value, intrinsic value) and one of which lies above (stock price). We further find that a stock option education program aimed at mitigating the tendency to disregard the time-value component leads to a significant change in valuations (in terms of both median values and dispersion) and lower reliance on simple anchors. Education in the form of cognitive feedback has a greater effect on subjective valuations of additional options with differing characteristics as compared to education in the form of outcome feedback on the original option holdings.

We present a revealed preference methodology for empirically analysing collective consumption behaviour. First, we introduce an integer programming (IP) methodology for testing data consistency with collective consumption models that account for publicly as well as privately consumed goods. This IP methodology can include information on “assignable quantities” for private goods. Next, we show that the IP methodology allows for recovering the personalized (Lindahl) prices for the public goods and the personalized quantities for the private goods. In turn, this implies recovery of the sharing rule (i.e. personalized income share levels). An empirical application demonstrates the practical usefulness of the methodology.

We consider cross-border competition by stock exchanges for listings from firms that have controlling shareholders who have private benefits. We examine exchanges’ choices of their listing standards and firms’ choices of the exchanges where they cross-list their shares. We show that the share price compensates controlling shareholders for giving up some private benefits and enables firms with growth opportunities to obtain listings on exchanges with different listing standards. In particular, firms with high-growth opportunities tend to obtain listings on stock exchanges with high listing standards. We empirically examine these predictions and find that they are consistent with evidence.