Using a strategic rational expectations equilibrium framework, we show that forcing a well-informed insider to disclose her trades in advance tends to increase welfare for both the insider and less-informed outsiders. Advance disclosure generates price risk for the insider, and to mitigate this risk, the insider trades less aggressively on her private information. Consequently, outsiders face lower adverse selection costs, which improves risk sharing and increases welfare. The drop in trading aggressiveness also causes market efficiency to decline. Furthermore, pretrade disclosure encourages excessive risk taking but may either encourage or discourage managerial effort.

A wide body of empirical evidence finds that around 25 percent of fiscal stimulus payments (e.g., tax rebates) are spent on nondurable household consumption in the quarter that they are received.To interpret this fact, we develop a structural economic model where households can hold two assets: a low-return liquid asset (e.g., cash, checking account) and a high-return illiquid asset that carries a transaction cost (e.g., housing, retirement account).The optimal life-cycle pattern of portfolio choice implies that many households in the model are "wealthy hand-to-mouth": they hold little or no liquid wealth despite owning sizeable quantities of illiquid assets.They therefore display large propensities to consume out of additional transitory income, and small propensities to consume out of news about future income.We document the existence of such households in data from the Survey of Consumer Finances.A version of the model parameterized to the 2001 tax rebate episode yields consumption responses to fiscal stimulus payments that are in line with the evidence, and an order of magnitude larger than in the standard "one-asset" framework.The model's nonlinearities with respect to the size of the rebate, its degree of phasing-out, and aggregate economic conditions have implications for policy design.

We find that bond price quotes impound bad earnings news on a more timely basis than good earnings news and that the bond market impounds bad news on a more timely basis than the stock market. We also find that the timeliness of the bond market reaction to bad news is concentrated primarily among speculative‐grade bonds, consistent with earnings news having a larger effect on bond price quotes when default risk is high. In addition, we find that a portion of the bad news impounded by the bond market reverses following the earnings announcement. Overall, our findings are consistent with bondholders’ asymmetric payoff function having important implications for the valuation role of accounting information in the bond market. Specifically, our findings indicate that bond quotes impound bad earnings news much earlier in the pre‐earnings announcement period than stock prices. In addition, bondholders appear to overreact to the bad earnings news initially and correct this overreaction subsequent to the earnings announcement.

We examine managerial compensation and wealth sensitivities around CEO changes. The average new CEO is incentivized to increase the risk of the firm primarily because he holds significantly less stock than his predecessor, and in fact riskier policy choices are subsequently implemented. Similar results are obtained in a subsample of CEO changes that are due to retirements and deaths, which alleviates concerns about endogeneity. Our findings indicate that firms seem to be limited in their ability to mitigate the risk-averse behavior caused by large CEO shareholdings.

Convertible bond calls typically cause significant reactions in equity prices. The empirical research largely finds negative and positive announcement effects for the in-the-money and the out-of-the-money calls respectively. However, this research has difficulty distinguishing between the two main theoretical explanations: the signaling effect and the price pressure effect. In this paper, we differentiate between these two effects by using a unique data set of the in- and the out-of-the-money calls in the United States during the period of 1993 to 2007. We find that the announcement effect for the in-the-money call is predominantly explained by the subsequent order imbalances; and the stock market's reaction is spread over an entire trading day, which is consistent with the price pressure effect. In contrast, the announcement effect for the out-of-the-money call is driven by the size of the called convertible bond; and the stock market's reaction is almost immediate, which is consistent with the signaling effect.

We develop and solve a model of optimal portfolio choice with transaction costs and predictability in house prices. We model house prices using a process with a time-varying expected growth rate. Housing adjustments are infrequent and characterized by both the wealth-to-housing ratio and the expected growth in house prices. We find that the housing portfolio share immediately after moving to a more valuable house is higher during periods of high expected growth in house prices. We also find that the share of wealth invested in risky assets is lower during periods of high expected growth in house prices. Finally, the decrease in risky portfolio holdings for households moving to a more valuable house is greater in high-growth periods. These findings are robust to tests using household-level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) surveys. The coefficients obtained using model-simulated data are consistent with those obtained in the empirical tests.

We develop two measures of board composition to investigate whether directors appointed by the CEO have allegiance to the CEO and decrease their monitoring. Co-option is the fraction of the board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. As Co-option increases, board monitoring decreases: turnover-performance sensitivity diminishes, pay increases (without commensurate increase in pay-performance sensitivity), and investment increases. Non-Co-opted Independence—the fraction of directors who are independent and were appointed before the CEO—has more explanatory power for monitoring effectiveness than the conventional measure of board independence. Our results suggest that not all independent directors are effective monitors.

We develop and solve a model of optimal portfolio choice with transaction costs and predictability in house prices. We model house prices using a process with a time-varying expected growth rate. Housing adjustments are infrequent and characterized by both the wealth-to-housing ratio and the expected growth in house prices. We find that the housing portfolio share immediately after moving to a more valuable house is higher during periods of high expected growth in house prices. We also find that the share of wealth invested in risky assets is lower during periods of high expected growth in house prices. Finally, the decrease in risky portfolio holdings for households moving to a more valuable house is greater in high-growth periods. These findings are robust to tests using household-level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) surveys. The coefficients obtained using model-simulated data are consistent with those obtained in the empirical tests.