Using an unexpected government regulation that restricted the ability of micro-finance institutions to recover loans in one Indian state, we examine whether this intervention impacted bank loan performance. The bank loan delinquency rate increased significantly as a result. In response, the ex-post bank credit supply declined by more than half. For identification, we compare loans from branches located in regions subject to this intervention with loans from nearby branches of the same bank located in regions not subject to the intervention. We conclude that political interventions in credit markets could have significant spillover effects.

Individual deposits in the United States grew from 5% to 23% of GDP between 1863 and 1913. A comprehensive database shows bank entry underlying this trend while historical events, including the National Banking Acts, resumption in 1879, and the election of 1896, influenced deposits at the bank-level. The nation's embrace of deposits was thus driven by stability of the monetary system and confidence in the safety and utility of established and well-capitalized banks. Bank-level and county-level regressions confirm these patterns for national banks over the entire postbellum period and for a sample of Midwest state and national banks from 1888.

ABSTRACT We investigate executive employment gaps (hereafter, gaps) between the appointment of an external CEO at a public firm and the individual's prior executive position at a public company. These gaps cannot be reliably obtained from common databases. We hand‐collect data for externally hired CEOs at public companies from 1992 to 2014. These CEOs represent approximately 40% of the 5,095 CEO successions and have a mean gap of 1.9 years. The gap increases to 3.2 years for the subset of new hires with a gap. We hypothesize that labor market frictions and executive skill sets contribute to the existence and length of these gaps. Using theories from labor economics, we predict (equilibrium) associations between two measures of “fit” (executive compensation and long‐term match quality) and gaps (both existence and length). Finally, we provide descriptive evidence on what executives do (e.g., sit on boards, work for private consulting companies, or consume leisure) during their gaps. This project was subject to and published through a registered report process. Any tests that were not included in the accepted proposal are marked as unplanned analyses.

Using novel earnings calendar data, we show that firms’ advanced scheduling of earnings announcement dates foreshadows their earnings news. Firms that schedule later-than-expected announcement dates subsequently announce worse news than those scheduling earlier-than-expected announcement dates. Despite scheduling disclosures being observable weeks ahead of earnings announcements, we show that equity markets fail to reflect the information in these disclosures until the announcement itself. By also showing that option markets respond efficiently to volatility-timing information embedded in the same scheduling disclosures, we provide novel evidence that markets fail to react to information about future earnings despite investors immediately trading on the underlying signal.

We document average abnormal stock returns of 14% for international insurance firms designated as Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SII). These gains are associated with a fall in average default probability of 15.6%, and statistically weak and economically marginal increases in expected asset risk. Over the same event window, identical measures for other large insurance firms show no significant changes in equity returns or implied asset risk, but an increase in default probability of 27%. These results suggest that G-SII investors still perceive a net gain from TBTF protection, despite new compliance requirements and costs. Our evidence also suggests that these gains are driven primarily from reductions in default probability, as results are consistent with investor expectations that the new regulatory regime will limit moral hazard effects from the guaranty.

We empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs, as measured by the compensation gap between a CEO at one firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar (industry, size) firms. We find that firm performance, firm risk, and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies are positively associated with the external industry pay gap. The industry tournament effects are stronger when industry, firm, and executive characteristics indicate high CEO mobility and a higher probability of the aspirant executive winning.

Abstract Our study evaluates the role of coordination, at both the government and the firm level, on the transfer prices set by U.S. multinational corporations ( MNC s) when income taxes and duties cannot be jointly minimized with a single transfer price. We find that either the presence of a coordinated income tax and customs enforcement regime or coordination between the income tax and customs functions alters transfer prices for these firms. Our analyses have implications for both firms and taxing authorities. Specifically, our findings suggest that MNC s might decrease their aggregate tax burdens by increasing coordination within the firm or that governments might increase their aggregate revenues by improving coordinating enforcement across taxing authorities. Our study is novel in that we document, in a specific setting, how coordination influences MNC s’ tax reporting behavior.

The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards reported in company disclosures versus economic value. We also find that equity-based grants continue to convey significant compensation convexity (vega) after ASC 718 (2005) and that, counter to recent claims in the literature, our analysis empirically reaffirms the presence of a causal relation between compensation convexity (vega) and firm risk.