This paper examines the impact of changes in deposit interest rate regulations on the common stock values of savings and loan institutions. The analysis indicates that stockholder‐owned savings and loans (S & L's) have experienced statistically significant declines in equity market values at the announcement of the removal of ceilings on certain consumer (small saver) certificate accounts and the introduction of short term variable rate money market certificates. We find the evidence to be consistent with the hypothesis that S & L's have earned economic rents from restrictions on interest rates paid to small saver accounts, and that relaxation of interest rate ceilings has reduced these rents.

We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post‐offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the three‐year post‐IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behavior by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable.