Canadian firms have different roots (e.g., more concentrated ownership and smaller size) than U.S. firms and Canadian regulatory enforcement follows a different route (principle- versus rule-based) that embodies the underlying intent of Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX). Financial restatements are more likely when Canadian firms have lower blockholder or management ownerships, lower proportions of unrelated directors, no financial savvy audit committee members and are not audited by prestigious auditing firms. To signal that they are dealing with the impact of agency problems on cash flow uncertainties, restating firms exhibit significantly higher turnovers of CEOs, CFOs and external auditors post-restatement, and they converge towards control-group governance post-restatement by making changes to the identified determinants of financial restatement likelihood. Consistent with prior results for U.S. firms, SOX had a small (extraterritorial) impact on the likelihood of post-restatement turnovers of management and other corporate overseers for Canadian restating firms.

This study investigates market price integration by testing per-share trade execution price or cost (TEP/C) differentials for matched intraday trades for a sample of Canadian shares cross-listed in the U.S. The TSE trade price advantage over the entire time period changed significantly after both the TSE's own minimum quotation increment reduction and that of its U.S. competitors. We show that the differential TEP/C is equivalent to the international effective spread differential and that market quality comparisons, which benchmark using the National instead of the International BBO, need to compare both national effective half-spread and midspread differences. Our cross-sectional regression results support our predictions that TEP/C differentials can be explained by differences in national midspreads and by ex ante proxies of national effective half-spreads. The TEP/C differentials vary inversely with increasing levels of our measure of signed market nonfragmentation.

This paper tests the overreaction hypothesis using monthly data for stocks listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange over the 1950–1988 period. Unlike De Bondt and Thaler (1985), (1987), it finds statistically significant continuation behavior for the next one (and two) year(s) for winners and losers, and insignificant reversal behavior for winners and losers over longer formation/test periods of up to ten years. While the systematic risks of the winners decrease significantly over all test periods, the systematic risks of the losers increase significantly for only the 12-month formation/test periods (unlike Chan (1988)). The only significant change in variance from the formation to test periods occurs for the losers for the 12-month formation/test periods. The findings are robust for January versus non-January and size-based portfolios (unlike Zarowin (1989), (1990)). The findings are robust for various performance measures (specifically, market-adjusted CAR, and the Jensen (1968) and Sharpe (1966) portfolio performance measures).

The odds of a current syndicate relationship between two lenders depend upon their previous alliances. The odds are significantly higher [lower] and strongest for a current lead–participant relationship with a continuation [reversal] of their previous roles. To illustrate, the odds are nearly four times higher when two lenders have allied in the previous 5years. The strength of lead–participant syndicate relationships between two lenders with same-ordered roles is most sensitive to the lead bank’s reputation and informationally opaque participants tend to have stronger relationships with lead banks. Lenders exhibit home bias in their syndicate alliances since ongoing relationships are stronger with domestic counterparts.

A general asset-pricing framework is used to derive a conditional asset-pricing kernel that accounts efficiently for time variation in expected returns and risk, and is suitable to perform (un)conditional evaluations of passive and dynamic investment strategies. The positive abnormal unconditional performance of Canadian equity mutual funds over the period 1989–1999 becomes negative with conditioning, and is robust to the removal of ex post index mimickers. The reversal in the size-based performance results with limited information conditioning is alleviated somewhat with an expansion of the conditioning set. The performance statistics are weakly sensitive to changes in the level of relative risk aversion of the uninformed investor. Unconditional positive performances based on averages of individual fund performances lose their significance when cross-correlations are accounted for using the block-bootstrap method. Estimates of survivorship bias due to the elimination of funds with shorter lives, which range from 36 to 58 basis points per year, are stable across performance models but differ across groupings by fund objective.

Lawrence Kryzanowski, Simon Lalancette, Minh Chau To, Performance Attribution using an APT with Prespecified Macrofactors and Time-Varying Risk Premia and Betas, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 205-224

Abdul Rahman, Lawrence Kryzanowski, Ah Boon Sim, Simultaneous Estimation of the Parameters of the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Models, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Nov., 1987), pp. 727-732

Firms headquartered in more corrupt US environments (states) provide higher payouts to their shareholders. Our results are robust to, for example propensity score matching, instrumental variable approach, headquarters relocations, quasi natural experiments using exogenous shocks, use of alternative measures of corruption and payouts, use of additional (possibly omitted) variables, and various alternative explanations based on additional channels and moderating factors. Our study finds that the use and marginal value of dividend payout as a shielding channel is affected by state-level corruption. Our study also adds geographic-based shielding as another important motivation for firms to make corporate payouts.