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Trading Volume and Different Aspects of Disagreement Coincident with Earnings Announcements.

The Accounting Review 1997 72(4), 575-597
This paper investigates the association between aspects of investors' disagreement around earnings announcements and investors' trading decisions. Theory suggests that trading volume arises because of investor disagreement, but disagreement is a multi-faceted construct. We find that three distinctly different aspects of disagreement each play an incremental role in explaining trading volume around earnings announcements, even after controlling for the magnitude of the contemporaneous price change. These aspects of disagreement are: dispersion in prior beliefs, change in dispersion, and belief jumbling . Dispersion in prior beliefs is the level of variation in expectations before the earnings announcement, change in dispersion is the difference in the level of dispersion in beliefs after vs. before the earnings announcement, and belief jumbling occurs when investors' beliefs change positions relative to each other around the earnings announcement. Our results indicate that each of these three aspects of disagreement is associated with investors' real economic (i.e., trading) decisions around earnings announcements.

Does the Medium Matter? The Relations among Bankruptcy Petition Filings, Broadtape Disclosure, and the Timing of Price Reactions

Journal of Finance 1998 53(3), 1149-1163
Drawing on a comprehensive sample of 330 bankruptcy petition filings from 1980 to 1993, we find that most of the market reaction does not occur on the bankruptcy petition filing date when the information becomes publicly available. Rather, most of the reaction occurs when news of the bankruptcy filing is more widely disseminated via the Broadtape. This “Broadtape announcement effect” persists after controlling for firm size, exchange listing, and predisclosure information. These are primarily timing differences since abnormal returns cumulated over an 11–day window centered on the filing date do not differ significantly across Broadtape disclosure date classifications.

Systematic Share Price Fluctuations after Bankruptcy Filings and the Investors Who Drive Them

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2007 42(2), 399-419
Beginning in the 1990s, firms often continue to trade on the major national exchanges after Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. For bankruptcies filed from 1993–2003, we find that the more negative the filing period price reaction, the more favorable the immediate post-filing returns, on average. This reversal is not attributable to bid-ask bounce, it holds after controlling for other factors associated with post-filing returns, and it appears more attributable to the activities of large traders than to small traders. Supplementary tests reveal that the pattern of post-filing returns differs significantly for bankruptcies filed in bull versus bear markets. Bankruptcies filed during the 1993 to 1999 bull market enjoy substantial but short-lived reversals averaging one-third of the filing period price plunge. These reversals are inconsistent with efficient assimilation of the bankruptcy information. In contrast, we find no evidence of post-filing reversals for bankruptcies filed from 2000 to 2003.

What’s My Style? The Influence of Top Managers on Voluntary Corporate Financial Disclosure

The Accounting Review 2010 85(4), 1131-1162
Financial economics has posited a limited role for idiosyncratic noneconomic manager-specific influences, but the strategic management literature suggests such individual influences can affect corporate outcomes. We investigate whether individual managers play an economically significant role in their firms’ voluntary financial disclosure choices. Tracking managers across firms over time, we find top executives exert unique and economically significant influence (manager-specific fixed effects) on their firms’ voluntary disclosures, incremental to known economic determinants of disclosure, and firm- and time-specific effects. Managers’ unique disclosure styles are associated with observable demographic characteristics of their personal backgrounds: managers promoted from finance, accounting, and legal career tracks, managers born before World War II, and those with military experience develop disclosure styles displaying certain conservative characteristics; and managers from finance and accounting and those with military experience favor more precise disclosure styles. These plausible associations confirm that our estimated manager-specific fixed effects capture systematic long-lived differences in managers’ unique disclosure styles.

Managers' EPS Forecasts: Nickeling and Diming the Market?

The Accounting Review 2010 85(1), 63-95
Nearly half of managers' forecasts of annual earnings per share (EPS) end in nickel intervals, whereas only about 20 percent of actual EPS end in nickel intervals. We provide evidence on the attributes, determinants, and consequences of this systematic wedge between managers' predictions and firms' ex post actual performance. Managers' nickel forecasts are not simply a benign response to uncertainty about upcoming earnings, because nickel forecasts are not only less accurate, but also they are more optimistically biased than non-nickel forecasts. In addition to uncertainty, efforts to protect the firm's proprietary information and self-serving opportunism in response to managers' economic incentives also play incremental roles in explaining managers' propensity to issue forecasts heaped at nickel intervals. We also find that managers' nickel forecasts spur even active analysts to issue forecasts heaped at nickel intervals, although analysts' forecast revisions partially adjust for the optimism and noise in managers' nickel forecasts.

Comprehensive Income: Who's Afraid of Performance Reporting?

The Accounting Review 2010 85(1), 97-126
Firms can report comprehensive income in either an income-statement-like performance statement or the statement of equity. Traditional theories of contracting incentives cannot explain this reporting location choice that only affects where comprehensive income data appear, because the contractible values of net income, other comprehensive income items, and comprehensive income are exactly the same regardless of the location where the firm reports comprehensive income. Drawing on theory, analysis of comment letters, and results of survey-based and behavioral research, we identify two factors—equity-based incentives and concerns over job security—that help explain why most firms do not follow policymakers' preference to report comprehensive income in a performance statement. Our empirical evidence on a broad cross-section of firms shows that managers with stronger equity-based incentives and less job security are significantly less likely to use performance reporting. Overall, our study suggests that even though the reporting location choice is inconsequential in a traditional rational markets view, managers act as if they believe that comprehensive income reporting location matters.