The provision of examples as implementation guidance is pervasive in accounting standards. Prior research has established that preparers engage in “example‐based reasoning,” a tendency to favor the accounting treatment in an example, even when the example does not exactly match the transaction at hand. In this paper, we investigate whether fact‐weighting guidance counteracts this tendency. Such guidance, now found in some accounting standards, indicates whether particular transaction facts are more important than others in determining the appropriate accounting treatment. Using an experiment, we find that fact‐weighting guidance does reduce preparers' tendency to favor the accounting treatment in an example. However, results also suggest that some degree of example‐based reasoning persists even with fact‐weighting guidance, and that preparers are not fully aware of how fact‐weighting guidance affects their judgments. Our findings have practical implications. They suggest to standard setters a potential remedy—namely, fact‐weighting guidance—for the misuse of accounting examples. They also provide insights to accounting preparers regarding how fact‐weighting guidance influences their judgments in ways they may not anticipate.

Information that firms provide about financial instruments and derivatives should help investors judge risk. However, this paper reports that such information often is not effective for this purpose. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate that the labels firms use to describe financial instruments and derivatives cause investors to assess economically equivalent instruments as different in terms of risk. We also show that loss-only disclosures that companies use to describe their risks cause investors to assess the same level of risk for firms with differing underlying exposures. Moreover, we establish that loss-only disclosures cause investors to make risk judgments that correspond to infrequently used risk-management strategies. We test two possible remedies for these judgment problems. Our results show that additional information describing the underlying economic exposures of a financial instrument does not eliminate the labeling effects. However, we do find that providing investors with upside and downside (i.e., two-sided) risk disclosures help them distinguish among firms using different risk-management strategies.

Analysts, Analysts reports, Investor behavior

Prior research indicates that a firm's use of derivatives to manage business risks is viewed favorably by investors. However, these studies do not consider a potentially key factor in this setting—namely, the typical behavior (or norms) regarding derivatives by other firms in the industry or the firm itself. In this paper, we report the results of multiple experiments that test whether norms are influential in affecting investors’ evaluations of firms’ derivatives choices. Our results show that the generally favorable reactions to derivative use actually reverse and become unfavorable when firms’ derivative decisions are inconsistent with industry or firm norms. Somewhat surprisingly, though, we find that industry and firm norms are not viewed similarly by investors. These results expand our understanding of how investors respond to firm's derivative use decisions and demonstrate the role of norms as factors that influence investors’ judgments in financial reporting settings. Our results have implications for firm managers making decisions about derivative use.

Certain financial statement items are closely related, such as items in hedging relationships. In this paper, we develop theory and conduct two experiments to investigate three different balance sheet presentation formats for related financial statement items. We posit that a linked presentation format rarely used in practice allows financial statement users to better distinguish among firms with different economics. Neither net presentation nor separate presentation of related balance sheet items allows users to make this distinction. The results of two experiments—one in a hedging context and the other in a lending context—support our theory-based predictions.

Academic and anecdotal evidence suggests that acquirers prefer to record higher goodwill values in business combinations so they can benefit from higher post‐acquisition earnings when goodwill is only tested for impairment. We conduct multiple experiments to test the hypothesis that this perspective ignores two costs that acquirers may also consider. Specifically, goodwill generally carries negative market perceptions and is associated with a risk of costly future impairment losses. Our results indicate that consideration of these two costs offsets acquirers' preferences for the earnings benefit of upwardly biasing goodwill. We also document that when there is no earnings benefit from higher goodwill valuations—namely, in a setting where goodwill is amortized to expense—we observe acquirers downwardly biasing goodwill values. Overall, our findings add nuance to our understanding of managerial discretion in the context of business combinations.

Accounting involves assigning numbers to events — quantifying them. Conventional wisdom holds that putting numbers to an argument enhances its persuasive power. There is, however, little scholarly evidence to support or refute this claim, in accounting or elsewhere. In this paper, we develop an original process‐based model of how quantification influences persuasion. We posit that including a high‐quality quantified analysis in a proposal enhances its persuasive power by increasing both the perceived competence of the proposal preparer and the perceived plausibility that a favorable outcome could occur. Under some conditions, however, quantification also encourages criticism of the details of the proposal, which potentially offsets these effects. We experimentally test implications of our model in a managerial decision setting, investigating conditions in which quantification is more and less likely to result in criticism of the quantified proposal and, thus, less and more likely to be persuasive. We also test the model itself using structural equations methods. Results largely support the model, which should prove of value to researchers interested in the effects of quantification on judgements and to those interested in persuasion.

This paper proposes and tests a risk model that explains how investors perceive financial risks. The model combines conventional decision-theory variables—probabilities and outcomes—with behavioral variables from psychology research by Slovic (1987), such as the extent to which a risky item is new, causes worry, and is controllable. To test our model, we conduct two studies in which M.B.A. students judge the risk of a broad range of financial items. Our results indicate that both the decisiontheory variables and Slovic's (1987) behavioral variables are important in explaining investors' risk judgments. Further, we demonstrate that information about the amount of potential loss outcome contained within mandated risk disclosures not only directly influences risk judgments, but also indirectly affects such judgments via its effect on some of Slovic's (1987) behavioral variables. By identifying this unintended consequence of current risk disclosures, these results have the potential to influence the way accounting regulators, firm managers, and academic researchers think about risk disclosure.