This study does not support the view that a large number of shares can be sold at the prevailing market price and at a small cost. A significant stock price decrease is observed at the initial announcement of secondary distributions. The price declines are greater for offerings by officers and directors and for larger offerings, but are significant for all types of sellers and for large and small offerings. There is no significant price decline at the offering when secondaries are announced in advance. Underwriting and other selling costs are substantial and are positively related to relative offering size.

We consider the relation between wages and productivity by means of a model based on the following assumptions. Workers live for 2 periods, firms live forever, senior workers differ nontrivially from junior, seniority enhances workers' expected second-period earnings, both firms and workers recognize the prospect of promotion and the senior-junior wage differential at the time of hiring, and firms have monopsony power in hiring junior workers. We show that senior wages are equal to the senior marginal product, but junior wages are set below the junior marginal product by an amount that depends on the elasticity of the firm's labor supply.

This paper attempts to provide a unified analysis of the effects of taxation on the equilibrium value of marginal q under alternative financial policies. It is shown that the q approach does not avoid all the specification problems associated with analyses based on the cost of capital. The (theoretically and empirically) crucial relationship between average and marginal q is also examined, and it is shown that, under UK and US tax rules, the possibility of winding up precludes persistent undervaluation in equilibrium.

In this paper we explore the incidence of a sector-specific minimum wage in a two-sector Harris-Todaro model with intersectorally mobile capital. In addition to the output and substitution effects in Harberger's tax incidence analysis, an additional effect reflecting the endogenously generated unemployment arises in the Harris-Todaro case. We also explore the functional incidence issue numerically for Mexico by using general equilibrium computational techniques. In a number of the calculations reported, capital more than bears the income loss from unemployment caused by the sector-specific minimum wage.

Sue McKinley, Kurt Pany, Philip M. J. Reckers, An Examination of the Influence of CPA Firm Type, Size, and MAS Provision on Loan Officer Decisions and Perceptions, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1985), pp. 887-896

John Whalley, Philip M. White, A Decomposition Algorithm for General Equilibrium Computation with Application to International Trade Models: A Correction, Econometrica, Vol. 53, No. 3 (May, 1985), p. 679

In this paper we explore the role of transitory income in the housing purchase decision. Because of moral hazard considerations banks typically require downpayments to be financed internally, hence transitory income is potentially important in overcoming the downpayment constraint. Using a novel approach to the measurement of permanent and transitory income, we estimate a two-stage model in which households decide whether to purchase housing in the first stage and the quantity to be purchased in the second. The results indicate a significant role for transitory income in both decision stages.

We prove the existence of general economic equilibrium under uncertainty when agents form econometric models of the relationship among their private information, prices, and the state of the environment. The functional form of each agent's model is specified in advance, with a finite number of parameters to be determined. Agents are then thought of as performing linear least squares estimation of the parameters. Equilibrium requires not only that markets clear, but also that each agent be using the vector of parameter values which, within a compact convex set of parameters, gives the least squares best fit to the data that is generated by the working of the economy when agents adhere to their models.

Dominant strategies seldom exist in non-cooperative games. Moulin's concept of a dominance solvable game generalizes, dominant strategy without dramatic loss in appeal. We consider a class of common-value auctions characterized by the property that the maximum of a collection of informative signals is a sufficient statistic for the entire collection. We demonstrate that this class of second-price auctions is dominance solvable.