This paper reviews and proposes additional research concerning the role of publicly reported financial accounting information in the governance processes of corporations. We first discuss research on the use of financial accounting in managerial incentive plans and explore future research directions. We then propose that governance research be extended to explore more comprehensively the use of financial accounting information in additional corporate control mechanisms, and suggest opportunities for expanding such research. We also propose cross-country research to investigate more directly the effects of financial accounting information on economic performance through its role in governance and more generally.

Financial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means for management to communicate firm performance and governance to outside investors. We provide a framework for analyzing managers’ reporting and disclosure decisions in a capital markets setting, and identify key research questions. We then review current empirical research on disclosure regulation, information intermediaries, and the determinants and economic consequences of corporate disclosure. Our survey concludes that current research has generated a number of useful insights. We identify many fundamental questions that remain unanswered, and changes in the economic environment that raise new questions for research.

We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital. These rents motivate poor young agents to work hard and save to overcome the borrowing constraints. With a labour market that is subject to moral hazard, the increased effort raises social welfare. Policies that reduce credit market imperfections, or redistribute income, may reduce welfare by dampening this effect.

I address the issue of how decimalization impacts the information acquisition decision of traders. I show that traders have less of an incentive to improve the quality of their information and, consequently, trades tend to be less informative following a reduction in the minimum tick. This result is consistent with the empirical finding that reductions in the minimum tick lead to declines in the adverse selection component, a finding counter to the theoretical predictions in the literature. This result also explains how the predicted savings from decimalization can exceed even total market maker profits. In addition, I show that even if market makers are perfectly competitive, a minimum tick can lead to multiple spread equilibria, some of which being more than one tick away from the underlying, or “no-tick”, equilibrium spread. Finally, I discuss the implications of the model for payment for order flow/internalization and the existence of an optimal tick size.

This paper investigates the association between population age structure, particularly the share of the population in the ‘prime saving years’ (40 to 64), and the returns on stocks and bonds. The paper is motivated by recent claims that the aging of the ‘baby boom’ cohort is a key factor in explaining the recent rise in asset values, and by predictions that asset prices will decline when this group reaches retirement age and begins to reduce its asset holdings. This paper begins by considering household age-asset accumulation profiles. Data from repeated cross sections of the Survey of Consumer Finances suggest that, whereas age-wealth profiles rise sharply when households are in their thirties and forties, they decline much more gradually when households are in their retirement years. When these data are used to generate ‘projected asset demands’ based on the projected future age structure of the U.S. population, they do not show a sharp decline in asset demand between 2020 and 2050. The paper considers the historical relationship between demographic structure and real returns on Treasury bills, long-term government bonds, and corporate stock, using data from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Although theoretical models generally suggest that equilibrium returns on financial assets will vary in response to changes in population age structure, it is difficult to find robust evidence of such relationships in the time series data. This is partly due to the limited power of statistical tests based on the few ‘effective degrees of freedom’ in the historical record of age structure and asset returns. These results suggest caution in projecting large future changes in asset values on the basis of shifting demographics. Although the projected asset demand does display some correlation with the price-dividend ratio on corporate stocks, this does not portend a sharp prospective decline in asset values, because the projected asset demand variable does not fall in future decades.

This paper considers why organizations use promotions, rather than just monetary bonuses, to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs. When performance is unverifiable, use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses. When employees are risk neutral, use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments. When they are risk averse, it may—sufficient conditions for this are given. The distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient (the Peter Principle effect) or fewer. “Promotions serve two roles in an organization. First, they help assign people to the roles where they can best contribute to the organization's performance. Second, promotions serve as incentives and rewards.” (Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 364)) “Promotions are used as the primary incentive device in most organizations, including corporations, partnerships, and universities … This … is puzzling to us because promotion-based incentive schemes have many disadvantages and few advantages relative to bonus-based incentive schemes.” (Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988, p. 600))

Many firms issue hybrid securities, such as convertible debt, instead of standard securities like straight debt or common equity. Theoretical arguments suggest that convertible debt minimizes costs for firms facing high debt- and equity-related external financing costs. Theory also suggests that an appropriately designed convertible security provides efficient investment incentives. We show, however, that firms on average perform poorly following the issuance of convertible debt. The empirical evidence suggests that the efficient investment decisions predicted by theory are not in fact achieved by the actual design and issuance of convertible debt securities. An alternative interpretation of convertible debt offers is that investors ration the participation of some issuers in the seasoned equity market.

This paper solves numerically the intertemporal consumption and portfolio choice problem of an infinitely-lived investor who faces a time-varying equity premium. The solutions we obtain are very similar to the approximate analytical solutions of Campbell and Viceira (1999), except at the upper extreme of the state space where both the numerical consumption and portfolio rules flatten out. We also consider a constrained version of the problem in which the investor faces borrowing and short-sales restrictions. These constraints bind when the equity premium moves away from its mean in either direction, and are particularly severe for risk-tolerant investors. The constraints have substantial effects on optimal consumption, but much more modest effects on optimal portfolio choice in the region of the state space where they are not binding.